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No-Fault Automobile Insurance:
Will the Poor Pay More Again?
Wilbur C. Leatherberry*
No-fault automobile insurance is a topic presently before Congress and
many state legislatures. Some states have already enacted statutes provid-
ingfor various forms of no-fault coverage. Throughout the no-fault debate
the interests of the poorer members of society have been inadequately con-
sidered. liz an attempt to test their ability to best serve the interests of the
poor the author examines enacted no-fault statutes and proposed bills. He
concludes that, for the most part, the enacted state provisions do little to
improve the lot of the poor; however, the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident
Reparations Act and proposed Senate Bill 354 are the best legislative pro-
posals to date.
"For the poor it [citizenship] consists in supporting and maintain-
ing the rich in their power and their idleness. At this task they
must labour in the face of the majestic equality of the laws, which
forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the
streets, and to steal their bread."'
I. - INTRODUCTION
T HE RECENT PAST provides numerous examples of well-publicized major legislative proposals directed at the problems of
the poor. President Johnson waged his war on poverty,2 President
* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School.
A.B. (1965), J.D. (1968), Case Western Reserve University. Staff attorney, Legal
Aid Society of Cleveland (1968-71); Legislative Assistant (1971-73) to Congressman
Louis Stokes (D. Ohio), who is a member and former Chairman of the Congressional
Black Caucus.
The research assistance of Thomas Visconsi and James Kallstrom, students at
Case Western Reserve University Law School, is gratefully acknowledged. The
author also wishes to express his appreciation for the valuable insights into ac-
tuarial science provided by Charles W. Crouse, a Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial
Society. Responsibility for any misstatements rests entirely with the author.
I. A. FRANCE, THE RED LILY 75 (Modern Library ed. 1917).
2. The "war" was declared in the State of the Union Message of 1964. H.R.
Doc. No. 251, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1964). The omnibus legislation enacted to
carry out the President's war on poverty was the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2994d (1970).
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Nixon proposed welfare reforms, 3 and now President Ford is resist-
ing pressures for an extravagant national health insurance system.4
Poor people and their advocates have focused much attention on
these and other legislative proposals in an effort to make certain
that the interests of the poor are represented and fully discussed.
However, there is another equally important legislative movement
where less attention has been paid to the interests of the poor.
No-fault automobile insurance in some form has been enacted in 23
states and Puerto Rico.5 In addition, a uniform law has been
drafted, 6 federal legislation7 has been proposed, and many no-fault
bills are now pending in state legislatures, largely due to the threat
of federal intervention. Although the impact of a change to a no-
fault system on the poor has been discussed in some instances,'
most legislators have failed to give it adequate consideration.
The cost of a no-fault plan must be the principal concern of
those who would represent the interests of the poor. Some plans
are too expensive in terms of absolute costs, meaning that all mo-
torists will pay too much for the benefits provided. Others are un-
acceptable because they are relatively more expensive for the poor
than for other motorists. Poor motorists should pay no more than
their fair share of the cost of a no-fault plan. Perhaps they should
pay less. Some benefits provided by no-fault plans may be unneces-
sary or even useless to the poor. An analysis of the method of
financing and the benefits provided is crucial to the proper evalua-
tion of any no-fault proposal.
Before considering these issues, an attempt must be made to
delineate the class of people with whom this article is concerned.
In addition, since the term "no-fault" encompasses a wide range of
insurance proposals, the various plans and their common features
must be described.
3. For an insider's view of the struggle over this legislation, see D. MOYNIHAN,
THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME (1973).
4. See, e.g., National Health Insurance Stalemated, 33 CONG. Q. 1091-93
(1975).
5. For a list of enacted statutes and major current proposals, see Appendix B.
6. UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS ACT (1972) [herein-
after cited as UMVARA]. Professor Henderson, one of the reporter-draftsmen of the
Act, has written a very useful article explaining the policy choices which were made
by the commissioners. Henderson, The Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Repara-
tions Act, 44 Miss. L.J. 107 (1973).
7. A bill passed the United States Senate on May 1, 1974, but it died in the
House of Representatives. S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
8. For example, the congressional hearings on the proposed no-fault bill for
the District of Columbia produced several interesting comments about the effect of
such legislation on the poor. See Hearings on H.R. 5448 Before the Subcomm. on
Business, Commerce, and Taxation of the House Comm. on the District of Columbia,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 169, 257, 276 (1973) [hereinafter cited as D.C. Hearings].
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A. Who Are the Poor?
Defining "the poor" is no easy task. Any attempt to formulate
a definition necessitates recourse to arbitrary criteria but is none-
theless essential to the present analysis. The poverty line used by
the federal government commends itself as a fixed definitional stand-
ard.9 Of greater assistance, however, is the enumeration of some
of the prominent characteristics of the group denominated "the
poor" without drawing bold lines to include or exclude people.
There can be little doubt that minority groups are disproportion-
ately represented in the economically disadvantaged class.10 The
aged also make up a very large segment of the group." In addi-
tion, millions of people, although employed, earn an income which
is inadequate to support their families at a decent level.' 2  Indeed,
the working poor may be the group most seriously affected by no-
fault automobile insurance because many, if not most, must drive
to and from work. 13 The enactment of a no-fault insurance plan af-
9. The poverty line concept was
[d]eveloped in 9rder to identify, in dollar terms, a minimum level of income
adequacy for families of different types in keeping with American con-
sumption patterns. Based on an analysis of the percent of income devoted
to food expenditures, an estimate was developed of the minimum cost at
which an American family, making average choices, can be provided with
a diet meeting recommended nutritional goals.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CONSUMER INCOME: CHARAC-
TERISTICS OF THE Low INCOME POPULATION: 1973 at 165 (Series P-60, No. 98,
1975). In 1973 the poverty line was set at an annual income of $4,540 for a non-
farm family of four. About 23 million people or 11 percent of the population were
below the line in 1973. In terms of households, some 4.8 million families and 4.7
million unrelated persons (those who live alone or with nonrelatives) were below the
line. Id. at I.
10. About 31 percent of blacks (compared with only 8 percent of whites) were
below the poverty line in 1973. Blacks constituted 32 percent of the low-income
population and only 9 percent of the nonpoor group. About 22 percent of those of
Spanish origin were below the poverty line in 1973, representing about 10 percent
of the low-income population. Id. at 2-3.
11. About 3.4 million people over age 65 were classified as poor in 1973.
They represented about 15 percent of the low-income population. Id. at 3.
12. In about one-half 'of low-income families the family head worked at
some time during 1973 and, of this group, 35 percent worked year round full
time. Of the low-income family heads who did not work at all during 1973,
three-fifths were women with family responsibilities or retired persons.
Id. at 3.
13. Public transit lines generally converge on the central business district while
many low-income ghetto residents work in the suburbs. In addition, public trans-
portation from the ghetto to the suburbs is slow and indirect in most cities. See
Meyer, Urban Transportation, in THE METROPOLITAN ENIGMA-INQUIRIES INTO THE
NATURE AND DIMENSIONS OF AMERICA'S "URBAN CRISIS" 41, 66-69 (J. Wilson
ed. 1968). Because public transit from the ghetto to the suburbs is inadequate, it
may be necessary to preserve and improve the access of the poor to automobile
transportation. As one writer suggests,
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fects all potential victims of automobile accidents and all owners
and potential owners of automobiles. It most seriously affects those
who can least afford to buy or to be without insurance coverage.
Because "poverty is not really a discrete condition," the class of
people with whom this article is concerned cannot be precisely
limited. Poor people have limited choices and those who are poor-
est are subject to the most severe limitations. However, the prob-
lems of poverty cannot be eliminated simply by moving people
across the poverty line.' 4  Accordingly, the analysis of interests of-
fered herein will be relevant to a very substantial number of people
above the government poverty level.
This article will focus on the interests of the poor who do own or
drive automobiles. The number of individuals who do not own or
drive an automobile, or who live in a household which does not have
one, is very small. 5 The members of that class are likely to be the
[S]ubsidizing auto ownership for poorer urban groups might be the most
economical solution to the immediate problems .... Since auto in-
surance rates tend to be very high in inner-city areas where the poor are
concentrated, auto insurance reforms designed to reduce premiums-
which are worthwhile in their own right-could also contribute to this end.
D. NETZER, ECONOMICS AND URBAN PROBLEMS 218 (2d ed. 1974).
Among families that own cars, the lower the income level the greater the propor-
tion of family income which is expended for gasoline. It appears "that 25 percent
of all car owners in the lowest income decile spend more than 20 percent of their total
income on gasoline charges." J. Holmes, The Relative Burden of Higher Gasoline
Prices, February, 1975 (working paper from the Panel Study of Family Income
Dynamics for the Office of Economic Opportunity; available from the Institute for
Social Research of the University of Michigan). If automobile insurance becomes
compulsory, poor people will be forced to spend a considerable portion of their
income for the coverage. See notes 50-52 infra.
14. Watts, An Economic Definition of Poverty, in 1 PERSPECTIVE ON POVERTY,
ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 325
(D. Moynihan ed. 1968).
15. In 1971, 79.5 percent of all households owned at least one car. Of house-
holds with an annual income below $3,000, 40.6 percent had a car. For other income
groups the percentages of car ownership were as follows: of households with
incomes from $3,000 to $4,999, 68 percent; of households with incomes from
$5,000 to $7,499, 84.2 percent; and of households with incomes from S7,500 to
$9,999, 91.3 percent. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1973 No. 542, at 332.
16. A study done for the Office of Economic Opportunity indicates that half of
the people in the two lowest real income deciles, compared with only one-sixth of
the population as a whole, did not own a car. Nearly three-quarters of households
headed by nonwhite females with children had no car. J. Benus, Transportation of
the Poor 2-3, July, 1970 (working paper from the Panel Study of Family Income
Dynamics for the Office of Economic Opportunity; available from the Institute for
Social Research of the University of Michigan).
The poor who live in households without a car will not contribute to a no-fault
plan but will sometimes be victims of accidents. When they are injured in accidents
involving insured vehicles, the plans will provide them with the same no-fault
benefits available to other victims. However, many plans fail to provide for these
[Vol. 26:101
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poorest of the poor. Their interest in adequate reparations should
be reasonably protected in any plan which provides good coverage
to driver victims.
16
B. What is No-Fault Automobile Insurance?
Pressure for reform of the automobile accident reparations system
has led to numerous proposals. 17  Most of the plans are now beihag
lumped together under the heading "no-fault insurance," although
they differ substantially. Hence, a politician's statement of support
for no-fault automobile insurance is comparable to a statement that
he likes classical music or French literature; the statement is so
broad that it is almost meaningless.
Actually, "no-fault' is a misnomer when applied to any of the
enacted plans or to those now under consideration. Today, no one
seriously promotes a plan which would eliminate fault as a basis of
recovery in all automobile accident cases.18  Even the most ardent
proponents of the no-fault concept argue for only a partial abolition
of tort liability based on fault. Their plans set a threshold, based
upon the amount of medical expenses incurred or upon other factors,
which determines initially whether a fault-based suit is permissible.
Unless the threshold requirements are met, the accident victim will
be limited to recovery of his pecuniary loss from his own insurer.
He will not be permitted to recover general damages 9 from the
victims when they are injured by uninsured or hit-skip vehicles. See notes 219-22
infra and accompanying text.
17. For a collection of the various plans and summaries of their features see
W. ROKEs, No-FAULT INSURANCE (1971).
18. Such a plan was proposed and introduced in state legislatures by the Ameri-
can Insurance Association whose members have been strong advocates of no-fault
insurance. The plan was described by T. Lawrence Jones, president of the associa-
tion, in testimony before the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee on
December 15, 1969. That statement is reprinted in Hearings on H.R. Con. Res. 24
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 27, pt. 3, at 1116-33 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as 1971 House Commerce Hearings]. Its unsuccessful track record
is documented in a table listing plans proposed in 1969, 1970, and 1971 and indicating
the action taken in various state legislatures. Id. at 1137-38.
19. These damages encompass nonpecuniary losses such as pain and suffering:
General damages are those which do not require a specific showing of
monetary loss, but are such losses which can be inferred from the evidence
of injury. These include, among other things, damages for pain and suffer-
ing, loss of use of body members or loss by amputation of a member (hand,
arm, leg, eye, etc.), total or partial loss of vision, and the effect of facial or
bodily scarring on the injured person's future enjoyment of life, as well as the
value of the loss of ability to bear children. They include losses presumably
incurred when there is a loss of opportunity which conceivably might have
yielded financial reward were it not for the occurrence of the accident.
General damages are such as the law itself implies or presumes to have
1975]
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other party, even if the accident was clearly the other party's fault.
Those who argue for the partial abolition of tort liability include
20Professors Keeton and O'Connell, the American Insurance Associ-
ation2 ' and its member companies, 22 and the Uniform Law Com-
missioners who have promulgated the Uniform Motor Vehicle Ac-
cident Reparations Act.23 Those plans which provide for partial
abolition of tort liability will be referred to herein as threshold
plans.24
Bar groups 25 and others, including Professors Blum and Kal-
accrued from the wrong complained of, for the reason that they are its
immediate, direct, and proximate result. The distinguishing characteristic
of general damages is the lack of corroboration-the lack of specific evidence
-of a specific monetary loss.
W. ROKES, No-FAULT INSURANCE 209 (1971). General damages are to be dis-
tinguished from special damages, which are "specific medical and hospital expenses,
property damages, and dollar amount income losses which can be verified by
reference to specific expenditures, evidenced by invoices, receipts, and other
records." Id.
The phrase "pain and suffering" is sometimes used in a broad sense to include all
sorts of nonpecuniary damages as is the phrase "intangible loss." Blum & Kalven,
Ceilings, Costs, and Compulsion in Auto Compensation Legislation, 1973 UTAH L.
REV. 341, 347 n.12. "Noneconomic loss" is another frequently used synonymous
phrase, but Blum and Kalven find it colorless. Id. "Noneconomic detriment" is
the phrase chosen for use in the uniform act. UMVARA § l(a)(9).
Professor Posner denies that such damages are "noneconomic." He agrees that
[S]uch losses, if they do not impair earning capacity, have no pecuniary
dimension. But this is not because they are not true economic losses; it is
because of the absence of markets in mutilation. A cannot buy B's ears
and tongue to gratify his taste for mutilating people and therefore these
things do not have prices. But they have opportunity costs: B would not
part from them for nothing. The attempt to affix a money value to human
suffering is disagreeable. But arguably it is even more disagreeable to in-
crease that suffering by reducing the incentives to avoid inflicting it.
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.11, at 82 (1972).
20. Their views and their plan are set out in detail in R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL,
BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965) [hereinafter cited as BASIC
PROTECTION]. The Keeton-O'Connell Plan is said to have begun the contemporary
momentum toward no-fault legislation. Blum & Kalven, supra note 19, at 341.
21. See note 18 supra.
22. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. is one such company. Its support of no-fault
insurance in either the pure form proposed by the American Insurance Association
or a threshold form was explained by the company's president, Frederick D. Watkins,
in 1971 House Commerce Hearings, pt. 1, at 247-62.
23. See note 6 supra.
24. For a list of threshold plans which have been enacted or are now under
serious consideration by legislators, see Appendix C.
25. The American Bar Association initially opposed threshold plans and even
those add-on plans which compelled the purchase of the no-fault coverage. See
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, REPORT in 1971 House Commerce Hearings, pt. 3, at 705-979. The
ABA later supported compulsory add-on coverage but continues to oppose threshold
plans. President Fellers Expresses the Association's Opposition to National No-
Fault Standards and Urges Reform at State Levels, 61 A.B.A.J. 701 (1975);
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NO-FA ULT INSURANCE
ven,26 the National Association of Independent Insurers,27 and the
American Mutual Insurance Alliance,28 have urged the retention of
tort liability in all cases. While they generally recognize the need
for some compensation for pecuniary loss to all victims regardless
of fault, they support plans which would provide such benefits
through expansion of the medical payments coverage now offered
in most automobile insurance contracts and the addition of income-
loss protection to that package. Their plans would not prevent any
victim from bringing a fault-based suit for the recovery of general
damages. Plans of this sort will be referred to herein as add-on
plans.29
Legislative debate has centered on the degree to which guaran-
teed compensation for pecuniary loss should replace the tort liabil-
M. WOODRUFF, J. FONSECA & A. SQUILLANTE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND No-
FAULT LAW § 12.12, at 368-69 (1974).
A special committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers proposed a plan
which provided for compulsory no-fault coverage while preserving tort liability in all
cases-the basic add-on format. The plan was discussed by W. James Kronzer, Jr.,
of the Texas Trial Lawyers Association in testimony before the House Commerce
Committee. 1971 House Commerce Hearings, pt. 2, at 577-78.
The Association of Trial Lawyers of America has supported add-on legislation
of the sort enacted in Delaware and Maryland. Hearings on S. 354 Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 394 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
1973 Senate Commerce Hearings].
The Ohio State Bar Association introduced an add-on bill in the Ohio General
Assembly. The bill is printed in 46 OHfo B.J. 455 (1973).
26. Their views are expressed in three important and provocative articles.
Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem-Auto Com-
pensation Plans, 31 U. Cm. L. REV. 641 (1964); Blum & Kalven, The Empty Cabinet
of Dr. Calabresi Auto Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 239
(1967); Blum & Kalven, Ceilings, Costs, and Compulsion in Auto Compensation
Legislation, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 341.
27. The position and plan of the National Association of Independent Insurers
(NAII) are discussed by the president of the organization, Vestal Lemmon, in 1971
House Commerce Hearings, pt. 3, at 1078-1110. Interestingly, the NAII plan does
not eliminate the right to recover pain-and-suffering damages in any case; however,
it does limit the amount of pain-and-suffering damages recoverable in the less
serious cases. In minor cases such damages would be no more than 50% of the first
S500 of medical and hospital expenses and 100% of expenses over $500. Recovery
would be unlimited in cases of "death, permanent total or partial disability, dis-
figurement or loss of limb, or other special circumstances shown to involve actual,
substantial pain and suffering." Id. at 1094.
28. Andre Maisonpierre, vice president of the Alliance, presents its views and
its plan in 1971 House Commerce Hearings, pt. 2, at 605-62. Like the NAIl plan,
described in note 27 supra, the AMIA plan limits the amount of pain-and-suffering
damages recoverable in minor cases but does not eliminate the right to such damages
in any case. Id. at 612-13. The AMIA plan also limits contingent attorney's fees to
25% of the recovery. Id. at 613-14. The plan would use arbitration for resolving
claims under $3,000. Id. at 612.
29. For a listing of states which have enacted add-on plans, see Appendix B.
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ity approach of requiring a tortfeasor, or his insurer, to pay for all
of his innocent victim's losses, including general damages. The
shift is "from a redress perspective to an insurance perspective. 30
Proponents of threshold plans seek to eliminate the great bulk of
the cases from the fault system by setting high thresholds which are
met only in very serious cases. 3' Although defenders of the tort
system argue for the right to tort damages in all cases, when pressed
they have settled for lower thresholds which eliminate fewer cases
from the tort system.32 Thus, enacted plans inevitably combine the
compensation and the liability approaches in varying proportions.
Whether they are of the threshold or add-on variety, virtually
all no-fault plans have a few common characteristics. First, they
provide for benefits regardless of fault for medical expenses and in-
come loss. Second, they deliver the no-fault benefits on a first-
party basis. This means that a victim claims against his own insurer
rather than the insurer of the other driver. Third, they compel or
at least pressure owners of automobiles to buy insurance. Fourth,
they utilize private insurance companies for coverage rather than
any form of government insurance. Fifth, they provide for payment
of benefits periodically as expenses and losses are incurred rather
than in the form of a lump-sum settlement. Given the political
realities of the situation, it is doubtful that any no-fault plan can
be enacted which departs in any substantial degree from these stan-
dard features. Poor people and their representatives will often be
faced with a choice among evils rather than a desirable feature with
no political chance of passage. Government insurance is a good
example; it might be best for the poor but it has little chance of
enactment in the face of the powerful insurance lobby.33
There is a common theme in statements made by nearly all
participants in the no-fault debate. Each advocate contends that
30. Blum & Kalven, Ceilings, Costs, and Compulsion in Auto Compensation
Legislation, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 341, 346.
31. For a discussion of the problem of designing a threshold, see notes 137-
52 infra and accompanying text.
32. For example, members of the 110th Ohio General Assembly, Regular Ses-
sion 1973-74, hotly debated the dollar threshold of proposed bills, none of which was
ultimately enacted. The committee bill provided for a $1,000 medical expense
threshold. A victim who incurred medical expenses in excess of that amount would
have been permitted to bring a tort action. Am. Sub. H.B. 251, 110th Ohio General
Assembly, Regular Sess. § 3938.08 (1973-74). As passed by the House on July 26,
1973, however, the bill set the threshold at $250. Committee action in the Senate
pushed the threshold up to $1,500. Id. § 3938.11(A)(5). The bill died without action
on the Senate floor.




his plan will reduce or at least stabilize premiums while equitably
allocating both costs and benefits. Not surprisingly, an opposition
plan is always seen as one which would increase premiums and
cause inequities.
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II. FINANCING No-FAULT BENEFITS:
WHO PAYS AND How?
A. Prologue: Compulsory Insurance
Despite the interest in the increasing number of auto accident
victims, compulsory insurance did not really begin to catch on until
the recent wave of no-fault legislation. Previously, liability insur-
ance was compulsory in only three states. 35  One of the reasons
for the slow growth of compulsory liability insurance is that the in-
surance industry has never supported compulsory coverage despite
the obvious increase in sales which would result. The main indus-
try objection has been the belief that compulsory insurance ultimate-
ly would lead to more stringent regulation or to government insur-
ance.36  Insurers also believed that to stay solvent and earn a
reasonable profit, they must remain free to select the risks they will
insure, especially in the volatile area of tort liability insurance.37
Compulsory insurance, they thought, would necessarily result in
governmental requirements forcing them to accept undesirable risks
or in the creation of government insurance plans for high-risk driv-
34. Compare Keeton, The Case for No-Fault Insurance, 44 Miss. L.J. 1, 14
(1973), with Spangenberg, No-Fault Fact, Fiction, and Fallacy, 44 Miss. L.J. 15,
72 (1973).
35. "Massachusetts pioneered compulsory automobile tort liability insurance in
the United States with legislation that became effective in 1927. Strangely, no other
state enacted such legislation until New York did so in 1956 and North Carolina in
1957." BASIC PROrECTION 76 (footnotes omitted).
36. Id. at 91-93. Despite four decades of compulsory liability insurance, Massa-
chusetts never made the jump to government insurance. Id. at 92. For a discussion
of the "perversity" of industry opposition to governmental compulsion to buy its
product, see Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem-
Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. Cm. L. REV. 641, 716-18 (1964).
37. Careful selection of risks seems to be the industry's way of dealing with the
uncertainties of the tort system and with what it considers to be inadequate rates,
artificially restricted by state insurance regulators. C. KULP & J. HALL, CASUALTY
INSURANCE 420-23 (4th ed. 1968). For further discussion of the rating problem, see
note 76 infra and accompanying text.
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ers.3" The industry still shows little enthusiasm for compelling all
39
car owners to insure.
Craig Spangenberg, former president of the American Trial
Lawyers Association, suggests that some insurers are now support-
ing compulsory no-fault insurance because "it will increase the cash
flow and reserves of the insurance industry. '40  If no-fault insurance
does indeed lower premiums as many advocates contend it will,
4
'
38. This argument has little force at present because, even where liability in-
surance is not compulsory, it is viewed by the regulators as a necessity. Insurers
have been compelled to offer uninsured motorists coverage as a way of providing
compensation where the tortfeasor is not insured. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3937.18 (Page 1971). In addition, insurers have been forced to participate in
assigned-risk plans which distribute the undesirable risks among all insurers doing
business in a state. The California assigned-risk plan was attacked on constitutional
grounds. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Maloney, 341
U.S. 105 (1951). In upholding the plan, Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court,
found that in the field of insurance, the police power of the states "is broad enough
to take over the whole business, leaving no part for private enterprise." Id. at 110.
39. For several years the American Insurance Association has supported com-
pulsory no-fault insurance and the total abolition of tort liability in auto accident
cases. See note 18 supra.
The National Association of Independent Insurers avoided the issue of compulsion
with a statement that the question whether a policyholder should be able to reject
no-fault coverage "must ultimately be resolved by each legislature on a state-by-
state basis." 1971 House Commerce Hearings, pt. 3, at 1190. The NAIl did, how-
ever, express a preference for the inclusion of no-fault coverage in every policy.
Id.
The American Mutual Insurance Alliance has said nothing about requiring all
car owners to insure but does advocate that every policy issued include no-fault
coverage. 1971 House Commerce Hearings, pt. 2, at 612.
While neither NAIl nor AMIA endorsed the concept that all car owners be re-
quired to buy insurance, their comments were made in the context of a consideration
of plans which preserve the right to bring a tort action in all cases. That fact may
account for their reluctance to go beyond financial responsibility laws to compulsory
insurance. For an explanation why undesirable risks are more undesirable in a liability
insurance system than in a no-fault system, see note 187 infra and accompanying
text.
At a meeting of nine of the "leading automobile insurers" held at the Camelback
Inn in Scottsdale, Arizona on December 8 and 9, 1972, the companies agreed to
support a no-fault threshold plan. The meeting was called by Nationwide and
Allstate, and The Hartford, Kemper, State Farm, Liberty Mutual, Travelers, In-
surance Company of North America, and Fireman's Fund participated. The so-called
"Camelback Plan" was something of a departure from the more conservative plans
which had previously been advocated by some of the companies and their trade
associations. An exposition of the plan and the text of the proposed legislation
appears in the Statement of Donald L. Schaffer, Vice President, Secretary, and
General Counsel, Allstate Insurance Company, in 1973 Senate Commerce Hearings
157-71. The plan compels every motor vehicle owner to buy and maintain both
no-fault coverage and liability coverage for above-the-threshold cases. It provides
criminal sanctions for failure to insure. Id. at 167-68.
40. Spangenberg, supra note 34, at 24.
41. Senator Warren Magnuson, Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee
which reported favorably on S. 354, testified before the Senate Judiciary Commit-
[Vol. 26: 101
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compulsory insurance can compensate for lost revenue by adding
new people to the premium-paying class. Many, possibly most, of
these new insurance purchasers will be poor people who until now
have elected to take their chances under the financial responsibility
laws. The poor automobile owner has no assets to protect with
liability insurance and can discern no reason to buy the coverage.42
In addition, coverage has been too expensive and even unavailable
to many low-income consumers, particularly those who live in large
cities.43
tee which also considered the bill. He reported on the Milliman and Robertson
actuarial study which predicted reductions in total premiums paid in every state if
S. 354 were to be enacted. S. 354 is, of course, a threshold bill. The same study
predicted premium increases in all but two states if an add-on plan were to be
enacted. Hearings on S. 354 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.
1st & 2d Sess. 140-45 (1973-74). Thus, it appears that the NAII and AMIA may
have an additional reason-protection of premium revenue-for supporting add-on
rather than threshold-type bills. See note 36 supra. Ironically, Mr. Spangenberg
also supports add-on legislation. Spangenberg, supra note 34, at 72-73.
According to the Ohio Department of Insurance, enactment of the threshold
bill recommended by the department would make possible a mandated premium
reduction of up to 10 percent. OHIO DEP'T OF INSURANCE, NO-FAULT INSURANCE:
A SPECIAL STUDY PREPARED FOR THE OHIO SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS, INSURANCE AND ELECTIONS 41-42. Several states have mandated
premium reductions by statute. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-351 (Supp.
1975) (10 percent); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.741 (1972) (15 percent); N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 677 (McKinney Supp. 1974-75) (15 percent).
42. Convincing a poor person that he should buy auto liability coverage was
never easy. Two decisions of the United States Supreme Court have made it even
more difficult. In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), the Court held that if a state,
pursuant to its financial responsibility law, wants to suspend a driver's license and
vehicle registration after an accident but before judgment in a tort suit, it must grant
a due process hearing. The hearing is "for the determination of the question whether
there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against him as a result
of the accident." Id. at 542. In Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), the Court
overruled recent precedent and held that a state could not continue a license sus-
pension after a tort claim had been discharged in bankruptcy. The Court found that
the Arizona statute had both the purpose and the effect of frustrating the federal
bankruptcy law by providing judgment creditors with leverage to collect tort claims
which had been discharged in bankruptcy.
43. A Department of Transportation study of insurance accessibility found that:
Most assigned risks live in urban areas. In New York the proportion
was 97.5 percent; in no State was it lower than 70 percent . . . . [P]roblems
of extremely high prices are concentrated in large cities; similarly, avail-
ability problems appear to be mainly a problem of urban areas.
Data indicate that a significant portion of insurance plan populations
are made up of people in relatively low paying occupations. The semi-
skilled, the unskilled, the agricultural worker, the hotel and restaurant
worker, and the unemployed appear disproportionately represented. To-
gether these groups accounted for 37 percent of the new assignments in the
eight States surveyed. By comparison, higher income occupations, in-
cluding professionals and semi-professionals, accounted for only 7.3 percent
of plan populations . ...
DIVISION OF INDUSTRY ANALYSIS OF THE BUREAU OF ECONOMICS OF THE FTC,
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Before the wave of no-fault laws, states generally used one of
two means to encourage the purchase of liability insurance. The
method which operated in nearly all states was the financial respon-
sibility law. In states with such laws, car owners are free to drive
uninsured without penalty so long as they avoid accidents. Any un-
insured driver involved in an accident for which he is potentially
liable is subject to license suspension unless he posts a bond or
settles the claim with his victim.44  The suspension continues until
the nonliability of the uninsured driver is established or until his
victim agrees to allow the suspension to be lifted because a settle-
ment has been reached.45  Satisfaction of a judgment or full pay-
ment of a settlement results in the lifting of the suspension,46 as
does discharge of the claim in bankruptcy.
4 7
The other means of encouraging people to insure was compul-
sory insurance. The three states which had compulsory insurance
required every car owner to present evidence of liability insurance
at the annual registration of the owner's vehicle.48 Compulsory
insurance can reduce the number of uninsured motorists but it cannot
eliminate them completely.49
Nearly all of the enacted or proposed threshold plans move away
from financial responsibility laws, which have permitted large num-
bers of people to drive without insurance, toward a more effective
means of compelling both liability and no-fault coverage.50 Some
plans provide for compulsory insurance, requiring the presentation
of evidence of insurance, both no-fault and liability, at the time of
vehicle registration and providing criminal sanctions for driving
without insurance.5 Many states have used criminal sanctions
52
REPORT TO THE DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION ON INSURANCE ACCESSIBILITY FOR THE
HARD-TO-PLACE DRIVER 40, 42 (1970) [hereinafter cited as INSURANCE ACcESSI-
BILITY].
44. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4509.17, .21 (Page 1973). With respect to
the constitutionally required hearing prior to license suspension, see note 42 supra.
45. Id. §§ 4509.22, .24.
46. Id. §§ 4509.23, .24(c).
47. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
48. Only one state, Massachusetts, required a certificate from an insurer each
year and made policies coterminous with the registration period. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. Ch. 90, § 34A (1969). The others, New York and North Carolina, simply re-
quired car owners to certify that they had insurance. All three states also imposed
criminal sanctions for driving while uninsured. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 90,
§ 34J (1969); N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW § 319 (McKinney Supp. 1974-75); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-313 (1975). See BASIC PROTECTION 76-86.
49. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, AFTER CARS CRASH 99-100 (1967).
50. See Appendix B.
51. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-3412b, 56-9915.2 (Supp. 1974); HAWAII REV.




or other penalties to compel coverage without resorting to the regis-
tration mechanism.53 Compulsion is less common in add-on plans,
but some add-on states do compel both coverages.54
There is a considerable difference between compelling liability
coverage and compelling no-fault coverage. The constitutionality of
compulsory liability coverage was established long ago."5 The bene-
fit to society is clear, and the need for compulsion is obvious. On
52. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-327(d) (Supp. 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 500.3102 (Supp. 1975-76); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-41-13 (Repl. vol. 4A 1974).
53. Some states make an uninsured motorist liable as an insurer for no-fault
benefits to victims who would have been covered if he had had insurance. E.g.,
COLO. REV. STA:T. § 10-4-705(2) (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-327(e) (Supp.
1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.733(4) (1972). Virtually all plans preserve an unin-
sured motorist's tort liability in below-threshold cases. E.g.. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 627.733(4) (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.67(l) (Supp. 1975-76); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31-41-9(2) (Repl. vol. 4A 1974); UMVARA § 5(a)(1).
Nevada preserved the financial responsibility law as a means of compelling in-
surance coverage. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 698.190, 485.010-.420 (1973). Like most
other states Nevada also bars recovery of no-fault benefits by an uninsured motor-
ist and denies him the tort-liability exemption. NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 698.390,
698.280.1(a) (1973). Colorado's plan is similar to Nevada's but it includes a pro-
vision making the uninsured motorist liable as an insurer for no-fault benefits to
his victims. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-4-705, 10-4-707, 10-4-715, 42-7-301 to 42-7-
304 (1973).
Some of the states which preserve the financial responsibility mechanism com-
bine it with other, more coercive provisions. Eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-327(d),
(e) (Supp. 1975) (financial responsibility and criminal sanctions); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 627.734, .735 (financial responsibility and revocation of license and registration for
driving uninsured even without an accident); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 92A-601 to -621
(1972); §§ 56-3412b, 56-9915.2 (Supp. 1974) (financial responsibility, proof of insurance
to register vehicle, and criminal sanctions).
All plans which rely on sanctions imposed on uninsured motorists who are caught
to deter others are likely to be unsuccessful in compelling coverage. The poor may
be served better by plans which require evidence of insurance for registration of the
vehicle. They would then be more likely to have no-fault coverage and to be exempt
from tort liability in minor cases. In addition, they would be less likely to suffer
from the harsh penalties most jurisdictions provide for driving while uninsured.
Plans which deny no-fault benefits to poor victims who are uninsured are especially
harsh. Victims who need compensation most are denied it because they have failed
to contribute to the fund. The issue of compensation for loss can and should be sep-
arated from the issue of contribution to the insurance fund. The Uniform Act pro-
tects all victims including those who fail to insure. UMVARA §§ 2(a), 18(d). To com-
pel coverage, the Act relies on a criminal penalty and an optional provision requiring
evidence of insurance at the time of vehicle registration. UMVARA §§ 70), 37.
54. Of the add-on states, Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina make both
no-fault and liability insurance compulsory. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(a)-(j),
§§ 2901-72 (1975) (criminal sanctions and financial responsibility law); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, § 539 and art. 66 1/2, §§ 7-101, 7-103 (Supp. 1974) (evidence of insur-
ance required to register vehicle plus criminal sanctions); S.C. CODE. ANN. §§ 46-744,
46-710 (Supp. 1974) (affidavit that vehicle is insured required to register plus crimi-
nal sanctions). The other add-on states rely on the financial responsibility mecha-
nism and some of them make no-fault coverage optional. See Appendix B.
55. Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933), upheld the Massachusetts law against
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the other hand, there are those who doubt the constitutionality of
compulsory no-fault legislation but their arguments appear weak.
5 6
the challenge of a Massachusetts citizen who said he could not afford insurance but
wanted to drive.
56. Professors Woodruff, Fonseca, and Squillante intimate that compulsory no-
fault coverage is unconstitutional. M. WOODRUFF, J. FONSECA, & A. SQUILLANTE,
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAW §§ 11.74-.75 (1974). They deny the
analogies to both workmen's compensation and to social security. With respect to
workmen's compensation they assert that it was not employees who were forced to
bear the cost of coverage, but first employers and ultimately consumers through the
price of the product. Id. § 11.75. Obviously the argument assumes that the employer
can pass the cost on to consumers and that he will do so rather than force employees
to absorb it in the form of lower pay. With respect to Social Security, they perceive
a difference between that system which taxes the insured to pay for government in-
surance and a no-fault system which compels the insured to buy private insurance.
Id. Their specific constitutional objection to compulsory no-fault insurance is unclear.
If it is based upon a contention that a no-fault plan is an unreasonable exercise of the
police power, that argument seems to have been thoroughly repudiated in the series
of cases dealing with statutory requirements that motorcyclists buy and wear hel-
mets. Bishop, The Validity Under the Constitution of the United States of Basic
Protection Insurance and Similar Proposals for the Reform of the System of Com-
pensating Victims of Automobile Accidents, in DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION STUDY, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION REFORM 35,48 n.30 (1970). Objections based
upon due process or equal protection are likewise without merit. Id. at 44-55; BASIC
PROTECTION 484-93; Cowen, Due Process, Equal Protection and "No-Fault" Alloca-
tion of the Costs of Automobile Accidents, in DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION STUDY, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION REFORM 1 (1970).
A compulsory threshold plan enacted in Massachusetts was upheld by the state's
high court. Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971). The court re-
jected an argument that the tort action in the below-threshold case had the status of
a vested property right. 271 N.E.2d at 599-600. It also found no impairment of what
the plaintiff called a "right to personal security and bodily integrity" which is implic-
it in the Bill of Rights. 271 N.E.2d at 600. Finally, the court overruled objections
based upon due process and equal protection.
Other compulsory threshold plans were upheld in New Hampshire and Florida.
Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 205, 304 A.2d 881 (1973); Lasky v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 296 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1974). The Florida court did rule invalid two features of the
plan, both of which were held to be severable. The fracture of a weight-bearing bone
as a minimum requirement for the right to bring a tort suit was held violative of equal
protection. Id. at 20-21. The abolition of the car owner's right of action in tort for
property damage to his car in minor cases was held to violate the Florida constitu-
tional provision that "courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury."
Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1973). The court was concerned about the abo-
lition of the tort right without the creation of an alternative right. Id. at 4.
The only case in which an entire threshold plan has been ruled unconstitutional
is Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972). The use of state funds
to enforce the law was enjoined. The threshold section was held to violate a state
constitutional provision against special legislation. It barred tort actions in minor
cases by victims who were given no right to collect no-fault benefits. Id. at 485-86,
283 N.E.2d at 478. No-fault coverage was not compulsory under the Illinois statute
which may explain the absence of an attempt to make benefits available to noncon-
tributing victims-those who had not purchased coverage. Compulsion can be help-
[Vol. 26:101
NO-FA ULT INSURANCE
The wisdom of compulsory no-fault coverage is also disputed.
Professors Blum and Kalven assert "the traditional presumption
against sumptuary legislation."" Why indeed should the govern-
ment force anyone to insure himself against pecuniary loss? If
no-fault insurance is so important, it would seem that people would
buy it voluntarily.
There are two basic reasons for compelling no-fault coverage.
The first is a paternalistic rationale that some people will not see
the value of the protection and will not buy the coverage. The
poor who need the protection most are likely to be prominent in
this group. Unless there is some degree of compulsion, no-fault
will not protect all victims and will fail to protect those who need it
most, the poor.59  The second reason is one of equity. A system
ful in minimizing equal protection problems by requiring every car owner to contrib-
ute to the insurance fund, thereby minimizing the size of the class of noncontrib-
uting victims. The most obvious noncontributing victim is a pedestrian, not covered
by automobile insurance, who is struck by an uninsured motorist. If all vehicles
were insured as a result of compulsory insurance, this victim could collect from the
policy covering the vehicle. No plan is likely to eliminate the uninsured motorist
completely; however, the Uniform Act does seem to eliminate the uninsured victim,
UMVARA § 2(a). Victims with no other source of no-fault reparations collect from
the assigned-claims plan. Id. § 18. Even a car owner who has violated the law by
failing to insure himself is given access to the minimum level of no-fault benefits if he
is injured. Id. § 18(d).
57. Blum & Kalven, supra note 36, at 678.
58. Viewed cynically, "no-fault is so good for people they should be compelled
to buy it, regardless of their particular needs or desires." Spangenberg, supra note
34, at 24.
59. See D.C. Hearings 169, 276; P. GILLESPIE & M. KLIPPER, No-FAULT 144
(1972). In 1972, personal health care expenditures for persons under 65 amounted to
S52,113,000,000. Of that amount, S32,593,000,000 was paid by private health insur-
ance, government, voluntary agencies, and in-plant facilities. The remainder,
S19,520,000,000 was paid by individuals from their own resources. HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE INSTITUTE, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 51 (15th ed. 1973-
74). Thus, nearly 40 percent of personal health care expenditures were not covered
by any of the usual varieties of health insurance. Obviously, some of the medical
expenses for auto accident injuries which are included in these uncovered expenses
would have been reimbursed by the liability insurance of culpable drivers. See note
102 infra. In addition, some of the expenses would have been paid by medical pay-
ments coverage, which is a no-fault coverage included in many automobile insur-
ance policies. N'either medical payments coverage nor no-fault coverage in the states
which had it in 1972 seems to be included in the covered-expense figure. However,
there remains a substantial total of medical expenses which are uncompensated. Driv-
ers who were negligent or contributorily negligent would not recover unless they had
some form of health insurance or no-fault coverage. It seems quite probable that the
poor are disproportionately represented among those who have no health insurance
or automobile medical payments coverage. The poor who are on welfare and some
others who are medically needy would be covered by Medicaid. Social Security
Amendments of 1972, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396(a) (1974). The working poor would not
have access to governmental health care and would be less likely than better paid
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could be devised whereby even those who fail to insure collect
no-fault benefits. 60  These victims could be subsidized either by those
who did insure or by the government.6 1 In private insurance it is
considered unfair to allow victims to collect benefits unless they
have contributed to the insurance fund. A basic principle of private
insurance is that each policyholder should pay a premium based only
upon the cost of his coverage.6 2 Government subsidy is also objec-
tionable to no-fault proponents for other reasons.63 Fortunately,
the near identity of the motorist class and the victim class makes
it possible to require nearly all victims to contribute by simply col-
64lecting insurance premiums from automobile owners.
Thus, compulsory no-fault coverage can be seen as a device to
force the poor to insure themselves against pecuniary loss. Com-
pulsory liability insurance is no more acceptable to the poor in a
no-fault system than it is in a fault system. In fact, because all
victims have protection for pecuniary loss, compulsory liability cov-
erage is less justifiable. A poor motorist might ask why he should
be compelled to buy liability coverage when he has no assets to
protect. Even the best threshold plans do not fully compensate
pecuniary loss for the most seriously injured victims. Those victims
are left to collect their excess pecuniary loss and their pain and suf-
fering damages through the traditional liability system.65 Only the
innocent victims who can prove fault by the other party will collect.
Compulsory liability insurance will do no more than assure that a
solvent source of reparations will exist if liability can be established.
Many of these victims could be protected without compelling the
poor to buy liability coverage. For example, car owners might vol-
workers to have employer-paid health care benefits negotiated by unions or provided
voluntarily as a fringe benefit by employers.
The number of days of work lost in 1971 varied directly with the level of income.
The lower the income, the greater the number of days lost. HEALTH INSURANCE INSTI-
TUTE, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 60 (15th ed. 1973-74). Part of the
reason for the greater number of days lost by low-income workers may be the inade-
quacy of medical treatment available to them. In 1972 only 61,106,000 people in the
United States had short-term disability income protection. Only 12,774,000 had
long-term disability income protection. Id. at 19. Again, the lowest income workers
seem to be the least likely to have this sort of coverage. Of course, most workers
would be covered for permanent total disability by Social Security.
60. See, e.g., UMVARA § 18(d).
61. No-fault plans which do cover noncontributing victims collect the necessary
funds from those who do buy insurance. E.g., UMVARA § 19(a). The more efficient
the system of compulsion, the fewer the number of noncontributing victims.
62. See note 74 infra.
63. See notes 82-86 infra and accompanying text.
64. Blum & Kalven, supra note 30, at 362; see note 15 supra.
65. See, e.g., UMVARA § 5(a)(6).
[Vol. 26:101
NO-FA ULT INSURANCE
untarily purchase supplementary no-fault coverage to cover excess
pecuniary loss. 66 Of course, poor victims are least likely to purchase
such supplemental coverage;67 although, depending upon the bene-
fits provided by the compulsory plan, they are likely to need addi-
tional coverage.
Unless both no-fault and liability coverages are compulsory, the
full protection of victims envisioned by no-fault planners will not
exist. Pecuniary loss protection is most important for the poor.
Their representatives may well desire to support compulsory no-fault
coverage, since poor constituents need the protection most and are
least likely to buy it voluntarily. Poor people will not need or want
liability coverage, however. Although such coverage should be less
expensive and more available to them if a threshold plan is en-
acted, 68 many poor people could rationally choose to do without it.
69
Their representatives should oppose any compulsion beyond the
financial responsibility laws with respect to liability coverage.
B. Government Insurance.
One way to reduce the cost of no-fault coverage would be to
have the state or federal government provide it. This would maxi-
mize the pool of insureds, thus taking full advantage of the law of
large numbers. 70  The plan would not need to earn a profit, and
the resources of government would assure its solvency. To date,




A government has two basic options with respect to financing a
compensation plan for accident victims. The first is to use general
66. Under the Uniform Act insurers may be required to offer such protection.
Id. § 16(a).
67. P. GILLESPIE & M. KLIPPER, No-FAULT 144 (1972); see notes 206-10 injfa
and accompanying text.
68. With the elimination of the small claims which now consume most of the
money paid out by liability insurers, liability insurance should be much less expensive
for everybody. According to the Department of Transportation study, claimants
whose economic losses were between SI and S1,000 suffered 33 percent of total
losses, but received 44 percent of the dollars paid out by the liability system. DE-
PARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION
STUDY, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 35 (1971). The poor will be attractive no-fault risks and should have an
easier time locating insurers who will sell them the no-fault and liability package
than they have had finding liability coverage alone. See notes 177-204 infra and
accompanying text.
69. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
70. For an explanation of the "law of large numbers," see R. MEHR & E.
CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 33-34 (5th ed. 1972).
71. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2051-65 (Supp. 1974-75).
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tax revenues to assist victims. With the arrival of the millennium,
a governmental plan which would guarantee medical care and a de-
cent income to all citizens might be in operation. The nature of
the misfortune would be irrelevant. Victims of accidents would be
cared for along with victims of illness or poverty. Since such a
system would not involve either the payment of premiums by bene-
ficiaries or the application of actuarial principles, it would amount
to a welfare plan rather than an insurance plan. It would have as
a major objective the redistribution of income.72 It has been sug-
gested that such a welfare system could coexist with the tort-
liability system to provide for guaranteed compensation to auto ac-
cident victims without sacrificing the virtues of the liability system.
Indeed, Professors Blum and Kalven have proposed a "stopgap
plan" which would provide that no-fault benefits be available through
government insurance financed from general tax revenues and that
the tort-liability system would be fully preserved.73
A second and politically more realistic option is social insurance.
Whenever the private insurance system is not working well, social
insurance becomes a possibility. Private insurance, because of its
antipathy to rate discrimination, charges some people far more than
others based on differences in risk. Equity among policyholders,
meaning that each should pay a premium appropriate to the risk he
represents, is an objective of both the insurance industry and in-
surance regulators.74
72. See D. BICKELHAUPT & J. MAGEE, GENERAL INSURANCE 197-98 (8th ed.
1970); R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 98 (5th ed. 1972).
Blum and Kalven argue that any compensation plan which provides benefits to
some victims by reducing the benefits to others, as the threshold plans do, is in effect
a welfare scheme for the redistribution of income from some of the more fortunate
victims to the less fortunate. Blum & Kalven, supra note 36, at 676, 721.
73. Blum & Kalven, A Stopgap Plan for Compensating Auto Accident Victims,
547 INS. J. 661, 668 (1968). The plan is a "stopgap" to serve until fundamental
questions are decided, especially the question whether there is "any reason why the
state should not pay for similar compensation to victims of other kinds of acci-
dents?" Id. at 670. If no-fault benefits are to be provided to accident victims,
Blum and Kalven argue that a welfare plan covering all sorts of accidents, illnesses,
and other misfortunes is the most rational mechanism. Blum & Kalven, supra note
36, at 722-23.
74. 1 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, MONITORING
COMPETITION: A MEANS OF REGULATING THE PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE
BUSINESS 93 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MONITORING COMPETITION]; Kimball, The
Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance
Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 495-98 (1961). The antipathy to rate discrimination is
based primarily on ethical beliefs which may or may not be generally shared. Dis-
crimination may be necessary to achieve the goal of socialization of risk. Williams,
Price Discrimination in Property and Liability Insurance, in INSURANCE, GOVERN-
MENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY 209, 240 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg eds. 1969); see
notes 160-65 infra and accompanying text.
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If it is desirable for society to have everyone insured, private in-
surance may not be the most feasible alternative because people
in the higher risk categories will find insurance unavailable or too
expensive. In a competitive market, insurers attempt to narrow rate
classifications in order to attract the best risks. A company can
compete for the best risks by grouping them with other good risks.
The rate for a class is based upon the average expected losses for
the class. By separating out the better-than-average risks, the com-
pany can offer a lower premium to the new, narrower class. The
better-than-average risks in other companies' broader risk classes
will be tempted by the lower premium to change companies. As
the process continues, the poorer risks are left with the companies
which have not yet narrowed rate classes and their premiums in-
crease. In order to improve their loss ratios and remain profitable,
the remaining broad-class companies are forced to use narrower
classes to compete for the profitable customers, the low risks. In-
surance becomes more expensive and less available for the high-
risk classes. The limiting factors in the process are the degree of
variability among the risks and the cost of differentiation among
them.75  This phenomenon has occurred in auto liability insur-
ance. 76  The need to insure everybody brings about pressure for
socialization of the risk-that is, "provision of insurance for everyone
at a price that is reasonable in terms of what the people in ques-
tion can afford to pay . . . and not in terms of the burdens im-
posed on society by their driving of cars. 77  The easiest way to
socialize the risk is for government to compel and provide insurance
coverage for the people who need it. Government can make the de-
cision to subordinate equity among policyholders to the objective
of universal coverage. The good risks subsidize the bad and every-
one pays the same premium. Society benefits because everyone is
insured and the good risks, although they pay more than the cost
of their coverage, may still pay less than they would pay in a private
insurance system because the government need not earn a profit
and does not pay taxes. Social insurance is able to maximize
loss-spreading-that is, spread the burden of losses over the largest
75. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 60-64 (Student ed. 1970). This
tendency toward increasingly narrow risk classification may be inhibited by the
switch to no-fault due to the improved accuracy in predicting losses which no-fault
will bring. See note 187 infra and accompanying text.
76. MONITORING COMPETITION 95-96; Kimbell, supra note 74, at 513-14.
77. Kimball, An Approach to a General Theory of Insurance Regulation, in
INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY 3, 7-8 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg
eds. 1969).
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possible class of premium payers.78 Of course, it is possible for the
government to set premiums the way private insurers do by adjust-
ing them to the risk, but that would detract from the goal of sociali-
zation of risk. 9
Ironically, Keeton and O'Connell, who are most vocal in oppos-
ing the continued use of fault as a criterion for auto reparations,
are also opposed to government insurance. 80 Although they believe
that keeping the cost of insurance higher for the high-risk drivers
will do little to deter negligent driving,81 they argue that the full
cost of accidents should be imposed upon the activity which pro-
duces them, the activity of motoring. One reason they offer is that
it is fairer for those who benefit from the activity to pay its cost.
82
A more sophisticated argument is that putting the full cost of acci-
dents on the activity of motoring should produce more rational re-
source allocation. 83 Professor James explains the thesis this way:
A system of liability which promotes proper allocation of
resources will not only limit the costs incurred by an activ-
ity (including accident losses) to those for which we are
willing to pay; it may also in present context have collat-
eral advantages. It will tend to assure compensation for
traffic victims and it will bring about a wide distribution of
the costs of accidents . . . . [I]f these ends were sought by
themselves, the most effective way to attain them might
well be some broad form of social insurance for all dis-
abling accidents; or, perhaps, for disability from any
source, the cost of which would be distributed over society
as a whole by general taxation. . . . If the accident costs
of motoring are externalized in this way-that is, divorced
from the activities which generated them-then the activity
in question will receive a hidden subsidy which will invite
78. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 46 (Student ed. 1970).
79. According to Calabresi:
Such an attempt would immediately suggest that the objective was primary
accident cost deterrence rather than loss spreading. Indeed, the very fact
that some would bear a greater loss burden than others and would do so in
relation to factors other than the desired income redistribution would mean
than [sic] full or optimal spreading was not the sole motivating force. Such
a way of handling social insurance would involve not only some concentra-
tion of accident losses, but greater tertiary or administrative costs as well,
for people would have to be placed in appropriate risk categories for taxation
purposes.
Id. at 46-47. Differentiating among risks imposes costs on the system and detracts
from the effort to make insurance affordable to all.
80. BASIC PROTECTION 266-68.
8 1. Id. at 247-49.
82. Id. at 257-59.
83. Id. at 25-60.
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us to vote for more accidents than we should be willing to
pay for if we realized their cost.
84
Professor Calabresi argues that keeping the cost of accidents on
the activity which causes them will result in what he terms "general
deterrence. 85  Permitting the edonomic forces of the market to
operate naturally will "decrease accident costs either by reducing
the cost-causing activity by making it more expensive, or by induc-
ing the introduction of safety devices to the extent that they cost
less than paying for the damages which they prevent. 86  Thus,
keeping the full cost of accidents on motoring should encourage
development of safer cars and should provide an incentive to reduce
the accident-causing activity, driving. In short, although the cost
of insurance may have little influence on how a person drives, it
may have a substantial effect on whether and how much he drives.
As discussed previously, the theory of general deterrence requires
that the full cost of accidents be borne by the activity of motoring.
This will affect the general level of insurance premiums. The theory
of deterrence also supports setting premiums according to risk classi-
fications. Failure to adjust premiums to risks would result in what
Calabresi refers to as "externalization due to insufficient subcate-
gorization." Just as total costs from motoring could be externalized
to the taxpaying public by social insurance, a portion of costs at-
tributable to a class of motorists could be externalized to motorists
generally. This would have the effect of subsidizing the higher risk
drivers by overcharging the lower risk drivers. If general deter-
rence is to work well, the higher risks must be subjected to greater
economic pressure.8 7  Although skeptical about the value of post-
accident fault determinations as a way of penalizing bad driving,
no-fault proponents do support the adjustment of premiums based
upon accident involvement.88 Thus, even in a no-fault system peo-
84. James, An Evaluation of the Fault Concept, 32 TENN. L. REV. 394, 401
(1965).
85. See G. CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, 68-94 (Student ed. 1970).
86. Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven,
75 YALE L.J. 216, 218 (1965).
87. G. CALABRFSI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 145 (Student ed. 1970). It is
also said to be fairer to charge groups which cause a disproportionate share of acci-
dents or which are better situated to reduce accidents more than is charged to con-
sumers generally. NEw YORK INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
. . . FOR WHOSE BENEFIT 67-68 (1970).
88. See BASIC PROTECTION 252-56. Keeton and O'Connell support involve-
ment rating rather than the more expensive merit rating which depends on case-by-
case fault determinations. Id. at 269 n.28. For a discussion of the effect of the
changeover to a no-fault system on rating risks, see notes 183-96 infra and accom-
panying text.
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ple who are high-risk drivers because of age, type of car, accident
involvement, or other actuarial factors would pay higher-than-aver-
age premiums. This can be a real burden on some drivers who
have never had an accident or a traffic violation. For example,
young drivers are now classified as higher-than-average risks.89
Who are the marginal drivers, persons who might be forced off
the road by the higher cost of insurance? The adolescent whose
age and lack of driving experience put him in a high-risk group may
find it more difficult to convince his parents to permit him to drive. 90
Parents may be faced with Hobson's choice-paying the extra cost
for insurance or providing chauffeur service. Society will suffer
little if this driver and some others 3re forced off the road. 9' A car,
particularly a second car, may be an affordable luxury for middle
and upper class families. General deterrence may lead to some re-
duction in the number of cars owned by this group at little social
cost. However, for poor families a car may be a necessity if the
breadwinner is to get to work. Public transportation from the cen-
tral cities to the jobs for ghetto residents is unlikely to be as good as
public transportation from the suburbs to the central business dis-
trict.92
Unfortunately, the principle of general deterrence may have ser-
ious adverse effects on the poor. Of all the marginal drivers the
poor are in the most difficult position. They are least able to absorb
the differential in insurance premiums which makes the deterrence
theory work. Many poor people therefore drive without insurance
coverage. 93 A disproportionate number of poor people seem to be
89. An unmarried male who is an owner or principal operator and who drives
10 or more miles to work is charged from 2.65 times the basic premium at age 21
to 1.40 times the basic premium at age 29. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRIVATE
PASSENGER AUTOMOBILE MANUAL 7 (1974). A married male, by contrast, would
pay from 1.65 times the basic premium at age 21 to 1.35 times the basic premium
at age 24. Id. at 6. In addition, the married male gets out of the higher risk category
when he becomes 25, but the single male must wait until his 30th birthday. Id.
at 6-7. Youthful drivers may be treated differently as insurers gain experience with
no-fault rating. See notes 183-85 infra and accompanying text.
90. An unmarried male age 17 or less who drives only for pleasure, not for work
or business, who has not had driver training and is not eligible for good-student credit
will add 2.75 times the basic premium to the family liability premium. Id. at 7.
An unmarried female, similarly situated, would add 1.75 times the basic premium to
the cost of the family liability insurance. Id. at 6.
91. General deterrence may even be helpful in encouraging people who now
drive to and from work to shift to public transportation by raising the cost of driving
in relation to the cost of public transit. See D. NETZER, ECONOMICS AND URBAN
PROBLEMS 203-04 (2d ed. 1974).
92. Id. at 217.
93. The Department of Transportation has estimated that about 20 percent of
the nation's drivers were uninsured in 1967, with the percentage varying from about
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in higher-than-average risk categories. This is true of assigned
risks and seems likely to be true of the uninsured population as
well.94 If they are to be pressured or compelled to pay insurance
premiums, poor motorists will need a plan which does not charge the
full cost attributable to motoring generally or to them in particular.
The poor have more to gain and less to lose than others if
some accident costs are externalized from the activity of motoring.
Poor motorists should happily trade the speculative, unmeasurable
benefit of general-deterrence accident-cost reduction for the obvious
benefit of lower insurance premiums. The cost of a plan providing
for general deterrence would include all of the costs of accidents
as well as the administrative costs associated with classification of
risks. However, there is a chance that the reduction in total acci-
dent costs because of the deterrence provided would more than offset
the added burdens caused by the elimination of externalization and
the classification of risks. If this occurred, a deterrence plan could
operate for a lower total of premiums than a social insurance plan
involving externalization of costs. All drivers would be better off
because of the overall reduction in accident costs, but the high-risk
10 percent in the compulsory insurance states to about 33 1/3 percent in some states.
INSURANCE ACCESSIBILITY 28. At hearings on no-fault legislation for the District
of Columbia, the District government estimated that about 30 percent of the District's
270,000 cars were uninsured in 1971. D.C. Hearings 24. Because the District is a
totally urban jurisdiction, the magnitude of the uninsured-motorist problem in the
city of Washington is clear. Most estimates are by state. The seriousness of the
problem in urban areas, where the poor and the high-risk drivers tend to be con-
centrated, is likely to be understated. Cf. INSURANCE ACCESSIBILITY 40.
94. See note 43 supra. Professor Prosser states that
[T]he uninsured are, as a group, those who are least responsible financially,
and so unlikely to be able to pay a judgment . . . . It is also undoubtedly
true that uninsured drivers on the highway are those who tend on the whole
to be driving unsafe vehicles, to be the most slipshod, law-violating and
reckless, and to cause a disproportionately large percentage of the accidents.
It is, in short, those who are unable to pay for the harm they do, who do most
of the harm.
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 84, at 557 (4th ed. 1971).
In testimony on no-fault legislation proposed for the District of Columbia, Charlie
Short, State-National Director of the Metropolitan Washington Association of In-
dependent Insurance Agents, expressed similar views. He stated that uninsured
motorists "have traffic violations and a lot of teenagers in high performance cars, in
undesirable neighborhoods" and that they are "the higher risk sector of the popula-
tion insurancewise." D.C. Hearings 103.
Of course, a concentration of poor people and high-risk drivers in the uninsured
category is to be expected as a natural consequence of the operation of the general
deterrence element in the liability insurance system.
The fact that poor people are overrepresented in the high-risk category should
not be taken as evidence that the poor are, as a group or individually, incompetent or
careless drivers. The classification of risks depends more on factors like age, sex,
marital status, and place of residence than on merit factors such as previous accidents
and traffic violations. See notes 171-74 infra and accompanying text.
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drivers would be paying relatively higher premiums and might
not be able to afford to drive. The low-risk drivers who benefit
most could compensate them for giving up driving. This would be
unlikely to happen unless the government compelled it. Further-
more, the premium cost saved by low-risk drivers is not likely to be
enough to cover both the compensation required by the high-risk
drivers and by the administrative cost of shifting the funds from
low- to high-risk drivers. What is more important, even a very ef-
fective deterrence plan is likely to concentrate the burden on the
poor because of the congruence between low-income and high-risk
classifications. 95 Given their present share of the nation's income
the poor cannot accept any program which compels them to pay any
more than necessary for needed insurance benefits. General deter-
rence would be acceptable if income distribution were satisfactory,
but it is not.
9 6
As discussed previously, government insurance would externalize
accident costs. A plan which would charge all motorists premiums
based upon the risk each represented would provide the most deter-
rence of any government plan. The burden would be on the activity
of motoring but it would be lighter than that which would be im-
posed by compulsory private insurance. The higher risk drivers
would have more incentive to stop driving, and there would be a
substantial chance that some poor people could not afford to drive.
A welfare plan financed by general tax revenues would involve the
most extreme externalization of costs. The burden would be borne
by the general tax paying population, minimizing the burden on the
poor, especially if the tax were a progressive income tax.97
The goals of general deterrence and income redistribution might
be sought in a compromise plan. Such a plan could impose the
full cost of motoring on the activity, charge higher premiums for the
higher risk drivers, but provide a governmental subsidy for poor
motorists.98 In other words, general deterrence would be applied to
nonpoor motorists but all or part of the costs imposed on the system
by the poor would be externalized. It may seem unfair to treat
drivers differently on the basis of income; however, disparate treat-
ment based on income has been accepted in other contexts. Two
95. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 63 (Student ed. 1970); see
note 94 supra.
96. Calabresi concedes that "any system of handling accident costs which tends
to aggravate bad distributions of income is likely to be unacceptable, even if it is
very effective from a resource allocation point of view." G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS
OF ACCIDENTS 80 (Student ed. 1970).
97. Blum & Kalven, supra note 36, at 721.
98. Cf. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 63 (Student ed. 1970).
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obvious examples are the federally funded legal services program
and the medicaid program which provide free legal and medical
services to the poor. Such a scheme may also amount to mere
tinkering with income distribution in an inefficient and limited way
when what is really needed is reform of the tax structure. 99
In addition to objections based on concepts of fairness or proper
resource allocation, Keeton and O'Connell have a practical reason
for proposing a private rather than government insurance plan.
They respect the power of the insurance lobby:
[I]nsurers have always vigorously protested even changing
the basis of liability for the insurance they write. Can one
imagine the vigor with which they would oppose having
not only their familiar and preferred form of coverage abol-
ished but also their function as well? Keep in mind what
powerful lobbyists insurers are. . . . [T]he controversy
over Medicare is instructive. If the insurance industry can
battle so effectively, along with others, to preserve such an
unpromising bit of accident insurance as insuring the aged
against sickness-so likely to be unprofitable that they have
developed relatively little of this kind of insurance busi-
ness-the vigor with which they would oppose any attempt
to abolish the whole automobile casualty line is stunning
to ponder. 00
Although it would probably be best for the poor and possibly best
for society generally, government insurance for auto accidents is not
to be-at least not for a long time.
However, this discussion of government insurance brings up two
important principles. First, the poor, more than any other group,
must oppose accident reparations plans which fail to minimize total
costs. Second, they must support plans which shift from the poor
part of the cost they impose. Both of these objectives are best
achieved through government insurance, although both may be at-
tained to a limited extent in other plans. Representatives of the
poor must identify the features of plans which affect total costs or
the portion of them to be borne by the poor. They will find more
political support for general cost reduction than for shifting costs
from the poor. Their power is likely to be negative rather than af-
firmative; defeating or modifying a bad plan will be easier than
enacting a good one.
99. Id. at 80.
100. BASIC PROTECTION 233 (footnotes omitted). Although it may amount to
overreaction, the industry opposition to any plan which looks remotely like govern-
ment insurance cannot be denied. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 36, at 716-18.
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C. Abolishing Tort Liability
1. Living With the Present Tort Liability System
The basic issue to be confronted by representatives of the poor
with respect to no-fault plans is the extent to which tort liability
should be eliminated. In pondering that issue they must consider
how the tort-liability system presently affects the poor. We have
seen that substantial numbers of poor people in states which have
not enacted no-fault plans drive without insurance.'0 ' They sub-
ject themselves to the risk of license suspension and tort claims
which may drive them into bankruptcy in the event of an accident.'
0 2
Those who do buy liability insurance pay rates reflecting the po-
tential loss to the person with whom they collide' ° 3 and the subjec-
tive factors which may influence a jury when determining liability.10 4
Those who live in urban areas must pay high rates and often find
insurance virtually unavailable to them. Most assigned risks live
in urban areas and a very substantial number of them are poor.' °5
As consumers of liability insurance coverage the poor have not fared
well.
Another issue to be considered is the value of liability insurance
to poor people who are victims of automobile accidents. Given the
fact that uninsured motorists tend to be concentrated in cities,
especially ghetto areas, poor people stand a better chance than most
victims of being injured by an uninsured motorist. For example, in
the District of Columbia, an all central-city jurisdiction with a heavy
concentration of poor people, it is estimated that 30 percent of the
drivers are uninsured. °6  Also, the poor have been notably less suc-
cessful than the affluent in recovering their losses through the tort
liability system.
[D]ata gathered by the Department of Transportation make
it clear that the negligence based insurance system dis-
tributes assets better to those who have the greatest edu-
101. See notes 93-94 supra and accompanying text.
102. Ohio's financial responsibility law is typical of the laws of states which have
not yet enacted no-fault plans. It provides that the registrar must suspend the
driver's license and the vehicle registration of any driver involved in an accident
who is potentially liable to any third party, who is uninsured, and who fails to de-
posit security with the registrar to cover the potential claim. OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 4509.11, .12, .13, .17, .19 (Page 1973). Although bankruptcy does result in
the lifting of a license suspension, it is a very unpleasant experience and has a
lasting effect on a person's credit rating. See note 39 supra.
103. See notes 177-80 infra and accompanying text.
104. See notes 166-67 infra and accompanying text.
105. See note 43 supra.
106. See note 93 supra.
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cation and who make enough money to support themselves
during the time-consuming claim settlement process. Ap-
parently these auto victims can afford to retain the best
legal counsel, make better appearances in court (at least
in the minds of the claim settlers) and have the resources,
determination, and sophistication to fight the system.
10 7
Because of their limited resources, poor victims suffer most from
the delays of the liability system and from the principle that only
the innocent injured by the faulty may recover. "[O]nly 45 percent
of all those killed or seriously injured in auto accidents benefited
in any way under the tort liability system."' 8 Only about one third
of the recovery for these serious losses comes from tort claims.
Most compensation comes from wage-replacement plans and no-
fault coverages paid for by the victim such as medical insurance
(including auto medical payments coverage) and life insurance.
Most important, in these serious cases only "about half of total
personal and family economic loss was recovered" from any
source. 10 9 Collateral sources of reparations from automobile in-
107. S. REP. No. 92-891, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1972).
The DOT study found that the average time between accident and settlement was
16 months with the length of time varying directly with the size of the loss. It
further indicated that in serious or fatal cases, "30% of families with incomes under
S5,000 retained counsel, compared to 42% of families with incomes over $10,000.
The ratio of reparations to loss was 0.38 for low income families and 0.61 for high
income families". DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
AND COMPENSATION STUDY, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE Acci-
DENTS 3 (1970).
A black legislator, State Senator Coleman Young of Michigan, testified at the
hearings on no-fault insurance for the District of Columbia that
Under the present system low income persons receive proportionately less
for their economic losses than higher income persons. It is low income
families who suffer the most because of the intolerable delays inherent in the
tort system. It is the poor person whose injury is worth less in "pain and
suffering" than a higher income person.
D.C. Hearings 169. A black attorney, Wilfred R. Mundle, testifying on behalf of
the Washington Bar Association at the same hearings agreed that blacks had not
fared well in the tort system but contended that the situation was improving "with
the jury complexion changing in the District." Id. at 256-57. Mr. Mundle, on behalf
of the Association, argued eloquently for the retention of tort liability, including
availability of pain-and-suffering damages in all cases. Although purporting to
represent the poor black population of the district, the Association position with
respect to abolition of tort seems more closely related to the self-interest of the
attorneys who handle personal injury cases.
108. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND
COMPENSATION STUDY, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
2 (1970).
109. Professor Kalven points out that
[T]he common law did not intend to compensate all victims; whether for good
or for ill, as a matter of principle, it did not compensate all victims of auto
accidents. I stress this obvious point simply because in so many discussions
it is announced with an air of discovery that the current system does not
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juries, such as health insurance, wage continuation plans, and the
like, are less likely to be available to the poor victim." °
In short, the poor suffer more than any other group from the de-
ficiencies of the present liability system."' If a plan is proposed
which attempts to eliminate some of the deficiencies in the liability
system, it would seem that the poor would have little reason to
oppose a change in the status quo. They should, however, oppose
some expensive add-on plans which leave the liability system large-
ly intact and in addition require no-fault coverage." 2  Like all in-
terest groups the poor must press for that sort of legislation which
best meets their needs.
2. Minimizing Total System Costs
The major reason for abolishing tort liability in some instances
is to reduce total system costs. If all victims, including those who
are at fault and victims of single-car accidents, are to be compen-
sated, either costs must be reduced or premiums increased. Thresh-
old plans eliminate the less serious cases from the tort system and
thus save the money now being paid out in the form of overpay-
ments of small claims. Small claims are being overpaid in the sense
that those victims recover several times their actual pecuniary
losses while claimants in more serious cases recover considerably
less than their pecuniary losses."
3
The most obvious way to reduce costs is to reduce benefits payable
to each victim and to spread the available funds over more victims.
achieve full compensation for everyone. That it does not do so is not a
sign that it is not working, but rather an indication that it is working accord-
ing to principle, albeit a principle we might wish to debate.
Kalven, A Schema of Alternatives to the Present Auto Accident Tort System, I
CONN. L. REV. 33, 35 (1968).
110. See note 59 supra.
11l. For an eight-count indictment of the liability system, see P. KEETON & R.
KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 457-59 (1971).
112. The reasons why threshold plans will be less expensive and more desirable
than add-on plans are discussed in notes 113-36 infra and accompanying text.
113. [I]t has been estimated that as much as 34 percent of all bodily injury
liability insurance payments were for the intangible losses of non-perma-
nently injured claimants whose measurable economic losses to date of settle-
ment were less than $5,000. If only claimants with $2,000 or less in eco-
nomic loss were counted, the amount of their "overpayments" still
constituted almost a third of all payments to all claimants.
In addition to the substantial reduction in benefits paid to the less seriously injured
victims there are substantial savings in administrative costs which result from the
elimination of disputes over fault and over the amount of pain-and-suffering
damages. BASIC PROTECTION 358-62; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTO-
MOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION STUDY, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES
AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES 131-32 (1971).
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This is essentially what happens when a threshold plan is adopted.
In opting for a threshold plan, policymakers force a class of victims
-those with less serious injuries-to bear certain of their own losses." 4
Victims of the least serious accidents give up their right to nonpe-
cuniary damages, generally referred to as pain and suffering, in
order to compensate all victims regardless of fault for all or some of
their pecuniary losses. The savings from the elimination of tort lia-
bility in minor cases could be used to provide a high level of no-
fault benefits or they could be applied toward reducing premiums
below today's levels. In reality, the savings will be divided between
the two objectives. Legislators and the public seem strongly at-
tracted to the idea of premium reductions, although higher no-
fault benefit levels may be a wiser choice." s
Although we might agree with Professor Posner that pain-and-
suffering damages represent real economic losses," 6 such damages
seem to be a "quixotic luxury"'"1 7 in a system which does not ap-
proach full compensation of even pecuniary losses, especially in the
serious cases." 8 The tort system was designed not for compensa-
tion but for corrective justice. Pain-and-suffering damages are
needed in a corrective justice system both to deter wrongdoing and
to give the victim the comfortable feeling that justice is being
done." 9
114. Blum & Kalven, supra note 36, at 669. Keeton and O'Connell argue that
given a limited reparations fund, it is more sensible "to use dollars to replace dollars
lost rather than to serve as a substitute for something not truly replaceable in
dollars." BASIC PROTECTION 362. They would permit people to buy insurance
for this pain-and-suffering loss but would not make it part of the basic insurance
package. The value of pain-and-suffering damages in minor cases would be left to
be tested in the marketplace. Id. The Uniform Act permits insurers to offer op-
tional no-fault coverage for pain and suffering which is called "noneconomic detri-
ment," and provides that the insurance commissioner may require insurers to offer
such optional coverage. UMVARA § 16(a).
115. Keeton, Compensation Systems and Utah's No-Fault Statute, 1973 UTAH
L. REV. 383, 397-99; Pearson, Implementing the No-Fault Concept; An Analysis of
Some Alternatives, 44 Miss. L.J. 74, 87-89 (1973).
116. See note 19 supra.
117. Blum & Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi: Auto Accidents and
General Deterrence, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 239, 270 (1967).
118. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
119. Blum & Kalven, supra note 117, at 268-70. It is important to remember
that corrective justice and distributive justice are not mutually exclusive. In fact,
[Tihe corrective and distributive principles, precisely because of their dif-
ferent aims, can easily co-exist in the same area. In particular, the dis-
tributive principle does not require us to say that tort law should abdicate
the field, or that the tortfeasor should be ignored. Nor, conversely, does the
corrective principle entail that a victim must wait until the tortfeasor's
liability is established (for assistance may be needed immediately, and this
the social fund can provide) ....
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If a poll were taken, the poor might well prefer the chance at
the jackpot which the availability of pain-and-suffering damages
means to the assured reparations for pecuniary loss which no-fault
provides. 20  However, if poor people are to be compelled to pay for
either a compensatory or a corrective justice system, the former
makes more sense. Corrective justice in minor cases is a luxury
the poor cannot afford, the cake they would like when they have no
bread. At this stage of the no-fault debate the poor are not free
to choose a compensation plan, a corrective justice plan, or no plan
at all. Instead, they will be forced to contribute to some sort of
automobile-accident plan.'2 ' In that context, the poor should favor a
scheme which emphasizes compensation rather than corrective jus-
tice.
In addition to reducing and redistributing benefits, threshold
plans offer substantial reductions in the administrative costs of the
system. The elimination of fault as a criterion is expected to pro-
vide considerable savings in the cost of investigating and paying
claims. Insurers will save because insureds may be expected to
report their own claims more promptly; because reserves can be
estimated more accurately for claims which do not involve intangible
damages; because cases involving no threat of a fault-based suit
will require less investigative effort and fewer professionals to
handle claims; and because settlements will be simpler to negotiate
in the minor cases. The likelihood of dealing directly with the
policyholder rather than his attorney is expected to reduce the cost
of settlement 22 as well as reduce the amount of money paid out
Stoljar, Accidents, Costs and Legal Responsibility, 36 MODERN L. REV. 233, 234
(1973). It is obvious, however, that if both objectives are to be served, the cost of
the plan will be higher than if only one of them is sought. See notes 129-33 infra
and accompanying text.
120. See Blum & Kalven, Ceilings, Costs, and Compulsion in Auto Compensation
Legislation, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 341, 355.
121. See notes 50-54 supra and accompanying text.
122. P. MAGARICK, SUCCESSFUL HANDLING OF CASUALTY CLAIMS 459-62
(1974).
123. The Department of Transportation found that in cases involving death or
serious injury about one-fourth of total tort recovery went not to victims but to
their attorneys for fees and other legal costs. Interestingly, the percentage of total
tort recovery representing legal costs was highest in cases involving economic loss
between $5,000 and $9,999. In those cases, legal costs amounted to 30 percent of
the recovery. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND
COMPENSATION STUDY, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
INJURIES 48 (1970). Spokesmen for the bar argue that "the victim who has a lawyer
receives more than he would without one, and the increased amount more than
covers the lawyer's fee." Spangenberg, No-Fault Fact, Fiction, and Fallacy, 44
Miss. L.J. 15, 37 (1973). Even if true, the argument does no more than justify
the lawyer's existence in the context of the fault system. It proves nothing about
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for legal services rendered on a contingent fee basis by the tort
bar.123  While there will still be disputes between insurers and vic-
tims over the right to no-fault benefits and the amount of loss,
proponents of tort abolition expect such disputes to be fewer in
number, simpler, and less costly to resolve than disputes involving
fault and pain-and-suffering damages.
24
A serious problem might arise if insurers could simply delay or
refuse payments to victims with valid no-fault claims. No-fault plans
typically award interest and attorney's fees to a claimant who must
sue an insurer to collect no-fault benefits. 25  However, if only a
letter or call from an attorney is necessary, the claimant may be
stuck with the legal fee.' 26  In addition, the fees provided by statute
the desirability of retaining a system in which such a substantial proportion of the
premium dollar goes for legal costs rather than the compensation of victims. It is
estimated that claims administration costs, including legal fees, amount to about 13
percent of the premium dollar for defense expenses and 10 percent for claimants'
expenses. P. KEETON & R. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS
514 (1971). Only 44 cents of the liability premium dollar actually goes to compensate
victims. Id. No-fault plans are said to pay much higher percentages of the premium
dollar in benefits. S. REP. No. 92-891, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1972). The difference
in efficiency may result because some no-fault insurance, like health insurance, is
written on a group basis, or because the plans cited are governmental and not private.
Spangenberg, supra, at 28. It seems clear that the cost of efficiency of the system can
be substantially improved by a change to a no-fault threshold plan but the efficiency
is likely to be lower than governmental insurance or group health plans.
124. See Keeton, The Case for No-Fault, 44 Miss. L.J. 1, 9-10 (1973). Be-
cause the no-fault payment is to be made by one's own insurer rather than a third
party's company, it may help to stimulate faster and more reasonable settlements by
insurers. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COM-
PENSATION STUDY, CRASH LossES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 128 (1971). But see Spangenberg, supra note 123, at 37, where trial lawyer
Craig Spangenberg argues that insurers are just as recalcitrant about paying first-
party claims and that insureds are more reluctant to press a claim against their own
company.
125. For example, the Massachusetts law provides for court costs and reasonable
attorney's fees to be awarded to a claimant who successfully sues an insurer for no-
fault benefits. No interest is specifically provided; however, the cases are to be
advanced for trial to avoid long delay. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34M (Supp.
1975). The New York law provides for reasonable attorney's fees and 2 percent
interest per month on unpaid claims. N.Y. INS. LAW § 675(1) (McKinney Supp.
1974-75). The bill passed by the United States Senate provides for interest on over-
due claims at 18 percent per annum and requires the insurer to pay the claimant's
reasonable attorney's fee. S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 106(a)(2), 107(a) (1974).
The Uniform Act has similar provisions for interest and attorney's fees. UMVARA
§§ 23(b), 24(a). By contrast, the Ohio bill provides for interest at 18 percent per annum
on overdue payments but fails to provide for attorney's fees. Am. Sub. H.B. 251,
1 10th Ohio General Assembly, Regular Sess. lines 364-66, at 13 (1973-74).
126. This would be true in Massachusetts where the law provides for attorney's
fees only in the event of a judgment. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34M (Supp.
1975). The New York law provides for fees if the claim is overdue and is paid after
an attorney is retained. N.Y. INS. LAW § 675(l) (McKinney Supp. 1974-75). Both
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may be inadequate to enable claimants to obtain representation.
Even if the claimant is successful, the fee is discretionary with the
court. Lawyers are not likely to find this double contingency attrac-
tive. 127  Ironically, the poor may be in a better position than the
nonpoor with respect to this problem. A person eligible for fed-
erally financed legal services could have access to free counsel,
while others would have to find counsel willing to work for the po-
tential fee provided by the plan's formula.
128
Add-on plans-those which do not abolish tort recovery-offer
little or no prospect for reducing premiums below existing levels.
It is possible that the cost of providing pecuniary loss benefits to vic-
tims at fault could be offset by the elimination of duplicate benefits
and by a decline in the number of suits, if many victims who re-
ceive the no-fault recovery then choose not to proceed with the tort
claim.129  However, by maintaining existing tort liability and adding
no-fault coverage to the insurance package, these plans probably will
increase the cost of the total insurance package. Of course, it is
possible that the existing premium level can be maintained if the
injury rate is declining or if insurance company profits can be re-
duced as one industry critic suggests. 30 Add-on plans might stimu-
late higher costs with respect to liability claims because victims
would be receiving compensation for basic pecuniary loss and could
better afford to pursue a pain-and-suffering claim. "[T]he provision
of first-party benefits in such legislation would serve to finance addi-
tional lawsuits, thereby adding to the burden on [an] overloaded
court system."' 3' The problem of no-fault benefits "financing"
litigation of the tort claim also would exist under threshold plans,
the Uniform Act and the federal bill provide for payment of an attorney's fee on an
overdue claim paid after the company receives notice of the attorney's representa-
tion of the claimant. UMVARA § 24(a); S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 107(a) (1974).
127. 1971 House Commerce Hearings, pt. 2, at 575-76.
128. See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2996f(b)(1)
(Supp. 1975).
129. See 1973 Senate Commerce Hearings 390-93.
130. Spangenberg, supra note 123, at 72-73.
131. Testimony of Melvin Stark, Senior Vice President-Government Affairs, of
the American Insurance Association, in D.C. Hearings 214.
According to Tom Downs, Chairman of the Committee on Uniform Motor Vehicle
Accident Reparations Act of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws;
Some people, so long as they are made economically whole, that is,
having their medical and wage loss taken care of, will not bother to sue in
tort for pain and suffering regardless of what the threshold is.
Other individuals, may, having received benefits to become economically
whole, say to themselves, "Why not try for additional benefits for pain and
suffering, regardless of how small the amount is?"
I am optimistic enough to believe that in minor cases people will take the
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but only with respect to the serious cases in which tort recovery
is permitted. Thus, no-fault benefits would improve the settlement
leverage of the seriously injured victims. 132
Add-on plans are a bad bargain for poor people because they
provide the same no-fault benefit levels at a higher cost than thresh-
old plans. Savings from the reduction in the number of tort claims
and the elimination of double recovery of pecuniary loss exist in
threshold plans as well as add-on plans. A very low threshold
might eliminate only a few of the tort cases that would have been
filed under an add-on plan. Higher thresholds would eliminate more
cases, and any threshold would assure that some reduction in the
number of tort cases would occur. If both liability insurance and the
added no-fault benefits are in some sense compulsory, the poor will
be forced to buy this bad bargain. Delaware, Maryland, and South
Carolina have already enacted such plans.
1 33
Because of the reduction in pain-and-suffering damages payable
to the less seriously injured victims, threshold plans do offer the
prospect of substantial cost savings. Part of this cost savings could
reduce the existing overall premium level. Additional cost savings
resulting from the elimination of disputes over fault and the amount
of pain-and-suffering damages are also likely. The realization of
these savings may depend on the way the threshold requirements
are drafted as well as on the number of cases eliminated from the
tort system. Threshold plan drafters would be well advised to use
factual (as opposed to evaluative) criteria. 34  It is conceivable that
first route, and will only sue in tort for the most serious losses. However,
an adequate threshold for tort recovery will assure that optimism becomes
a reality.
1973 Senate Commerce Hearings 130.
132. Id.; Keeton, Compensation Systems and Utah's No-Fault Statute, 1973
UTAH L. REV. 383, 387.
133. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2218 (Supp. 1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §
539 and art. 66 1/2, § 7-101 (Supp. 1974); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-750.120, .146, .152
(Supp. 1974).
134. R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 1.6, at 24 (1971). Use of
evaluative criteria allows for flexibility but "such flexibility has its costs as well as
its benefits. There is less assurance of consistency and evenhandedness than when
less elastic criteria are used. And administrative costs tend to rise with the degree
of discretion committed to those responsible for applying the criterion to individual
cases." Id. at 24-25. General and imprecise criteria can "reduce predictability and
thereby impede the settlement process." Id. at 25 n.5. Thus, a threshold criterion
allowing tort actions in cases involving death is likely to be relatively simple and
inexpensive to administer. By contrast, the criterion "permanent serious dis-
figurement" and other such phrases are much less definite and may generate
numerous and costly disputes. See Schwartz, No-Fault Insurance: Litigation of
Threshold Questions Under the New York Statute-The Neglected Procedural
Dimension, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 37, 44 (1974).
The statute proposed by Professors Keeton and O'Connell minimizes evaluative
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disputes over whether threshold requirements have been met could
partially replace disputes over fault and pain and suffering in the
cases eliminated from the fault system. Evaluative issues with re-
spect to threshold criteria could preserve the nuisance claim in the
new system. "Without a significant exemption, many accident vic-
tims whose claims for economic loss had been fully compensated
by basic reparation benefits and who had not suffered some very
serious injury, would have an arguable case, with some settlement
value, for recovery beyond their out-of-pocket losses."' Enacting
a dollar threshold which is high enough to minimize the number of
cases that approach it and being as specific as possible when de-
fining serious injury will help minimize the number and cost of such
disputes.
131
3. Designing a Threshold Fair to the Poor
There are at least two major issues to consider when establish-
ing a threshold in a no-fault plan. The first is the basic question of
how many cases should be removed from the tort system. All
threshold plans will eliminate tort recovery in a substantial number
of cases, but some are much more restrictive than others. Because
they will fare better under a no-fault system than under a fault sys-
tem, the poor should favor a high-threshold plan-one which eliminates
all but the most serious cases. 1
7
The second issue may be even more important to the poor.
That is the problem of defining serious cases. Nearly all of the en-
acted threshold plans permit tort suits for pain-and-suffering dam-
ages when the victim has suffered specified injuries or has incurred
issues by using the dollars of tort damages recoverable rather than any definition of
serious injury. Their plan permits tort suits only if pain-and-suffering damages
recoverable exceed S5000 or damages recoverable for economic loss exceed $10,000.
Motor Vehicle Basic Protection Insurance Act § 4.2(a), in BASIC PROTECTION 323.
No jurisdiction has adopted such criteria. Virtually all of the enacted threshold
plans use evaluative criteria in combination with a dollars-of-medical-expense cri-
terion. The drafters of the Uniform Act elected to use evaluative criteria ("sig-
nificant permanent injury" and "serious permanent disfigurement") but to limit
severely the number of cases in which disputes over these terms would occur by
requiring that the first $5000 of damages for noneconomic loss be deducted from
any tort recovery. UMVARA § 5(a)(7), Comment, at 29.
135. Id.
136. See notes 122-24 supra and accompanying text.
137. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-714(a) (1973); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN.
§ 500.3135(1) (Supp. 1975-76); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 671.4(a), 673.1 (McKinney Supp.
1974-75). Even if death occurred, the Uniform Act would require deduction of the




medical expenses in excess of a specified monetary level.'38 There
is considerable variation among the enacted threshold statutes
with respect to the specific injuries which give rise to tort suits for
pain-and-suffering damages;13 9 however, the statutes are unani-
mous in allowing such suits in cases where death has occurred. The
specified-injury criteria would seem to treat rich and poor alike.
If it can be said that the victim has suffered one of the enumerated
serious injuries, his economic status should make no difference. It
is even possible that some poor people might have a greater chance
to assert such a claim since they have access to federally funded
legal services. 40  Other victims would have to pay a retainer or
find private counsel willing to assert the claim and wait for the fee.
The medical-expense threshold, on the other hand, offers the po-
tential of favoring the affluent because of the "ethical standard of
the medical profession to set fees according to the ability of the
patient to pay."' 4' Thus, statutes which use a standard based on the
fee charged might be adjudged unconstitutional because they dis-
criminate against the poor. 14 2  For this reason, most plans use a
138. The dollar threshold is indicated for each threshold plan listed in Appendix
C.
139. Dismemberment is an injury which gives the victim the right to sue in tort
in some jurisdictions. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737(2) (1972); N.Y. INs. LAW
§§ 671.4(a), 673.1 (McKinney Supp. 1974-75); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-41-9(b) (Repl.
vol. 4A 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 698.280(a) (1973). Long-term disability, variously
defined, is another common criterion. E.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-714(c)
(1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.51.3(b)(2) (Supp. 1975-76); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 56-3402b(j), 56-3410b(a) (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-41-9(c) (Repl. vol.
4A 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 698.280.1(h) (1973). Disfigurement, usually modified
by adjectives like "serious" or "permanent" is used in many states. E.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 627.737(2) (1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-323(a)(4)(Supp. 1975); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 56-3402b(j), 56-3410b(a) (Supp. 1974); N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 671.4(a),
673.1 (McKinney Supp. 1974-75). Many states permit tort suits by victims who
suffer fractures or certain kinds of fractures. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737(2)
(1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-323(a)(3) (Supp. 1975); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 56-3402b(j), 56-3410b(a) (Supp. 1974); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 671.4(a), 673.1 (McKinney
Supp. 1974-75). Some states abandon attempts at specificity and use broad general
criteria like "serious permanent injury" or "serious impairment of body function."
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3135(1) (Supp. 1975-76); N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 671.4(a),
673.1 (McKinney Supp. 1974-75); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.53.3(b)(2) (Supp. 1975-76);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-3402bo), 56-3410b(a) (Supp. 1974); NEv. REV. STAT. §
698.280.1(h) (1973).
140. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
141. Spangenberg, supra note 123, at 71.
142. 1973 Senate Commerce Hearings 387, 762-63. In Grace v. Howlett, 51
Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972), the trial court had held that the Illinois no-fault
statute was unconstitutional because the threshold based upon "reasonable medical
expenses" resulted in "irrational discrimination against economically disadvantaged
persons." Id. at 488-89, 283 N.E.2d at 480. Because it ruled the statute unconsti-
tutional on other grounds, the Illinois Supreme Court did not reach this economic
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standard based upon the reasonable value of the services rendered
rather than the fee charged. A reasonable value standard appears
in many of the enacted threshold laws. For example, the New York
statute uses the phrase "reasonable and customary charges."'
' 43
The Pennsylvania law speaks of the "reasonable value of reasonable
and necessary medical and dental services."' 44  However, the New
Jersey statute uses the standard of actual expenses incurred for med-
ical services and appears to be especially vulnerable to an equal pro-
tection challenge. 45  The reasonable value of the doctor's services
may be difficult to ascertain, and because of administrative costs
and bureaucratic inertia, the fee charged is likely to be presump-
tive evidence of value.
146
One way to avoid the potential inequities associated with a
threshold derived from the medical expense incurred is to use a
threshold based upon damages recoverable. Pecuniary damages, such
as medical expense and income loss, could not be used as a stand-
ard because poor people would incur lower losses than the affluent.
A standard based upon pain-and-suffering damages, however, could
work in a nondiscriminatory way. The amount of such damages
would be determined only after trial and the threshold amount
could then be subtracted. For example, serious cases could be de-
fined as those in which a judge or jury might award more than
$5,000 for pain and suffering. The plaintiff would then actually be
discrimination argument. The equal protection argument is not an easy one to
make. If poor people were a suspect class, the courts would require a compelling state
interest to support the classification. However, poverty alone is not sufficient to make
a class suspect. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
16-29 (1973). Nor is there any discernible substantive constitutional right infringed
by no-fault legislation. That, too, would provide reason for special scrutiny. Cf.
id. at 33-37. In the absence of a reason for special scrutiny, the statute must only
"bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes." Id. at 40. For an
equal protection analysis of the the burden imposed on the poor by the financial
responsibility laws, see Note, Personal Rights as an Emerging Approach to Equal
Protection: Automobile Financial Responsibility Laws and the Right to Drive, 24
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 163, 174-99 (1972). The author concludes that there is no
basis for special scrutiny of such laws. Even if the compelling interest test were
applicable, he feels the laws would survive an attack based upon equal protection.
In Grace the argument was based on a state constitutional prohibition against
special legislation. That provision was the basis of the decision that the Illinois
statute arbitrarily discriminated against some classes of victims. Grace v. Howlett,
supra, at 487-88, 283 N.E.2d at 479.
143. N.Y. INs. LAW § 671.4(b) (McKinney Supp. 1974-75).
144. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301(a)(5)(b) (Supp. 1975-76).
145. E.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 39: 6A-8 (1973). See note 142 supra.
146. It will be impossible to examine the reasonableness of every charge. Broad
guidelines setting maximums beyond which reasonableness will be questioned could
be adopted, but considerable variation in fees will continue unless a fixed schedule
of fees is promulgated.
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awarded the pain-and-suffering damages in excess of that figure.
If the finder of fact awarded less than $5,000, the plaintiff would
collect nothing in the tort suit. This prospect obviously would dis-
courage attorneys working on a contingent-fee basis from taking
cases which they think are likely to result in damages below or only
slightly above the threshold amount. Judges and juries might negate
the effect of the threshold by simply adding the threshold amount
to their awards.1 47  Nevertheless, the Keeton and O'Connell plan,
UMVARA, and the Puerto Rican statute have adopted this ap-
proach.
148
If we assume that poor people recover pain-and-suffering dam-
ages to the same extent as those who are more affluent, a threshold
using dollars of pain-and-suffering damages recoverable will work
fairly. There are indications that damage claims of poor people,
particularly members of racial minorities, have been discounted by
fact finders.' 49  Whether such discrimination occurs today, or oc-
curred in the past, a pain-and-suffering threshold may not be the best
choice. Any dollar threshold could become ineffective because of
inflation. Accordingly, if medical expense is used, the rising costs
of medical care would force upward adjustment of the threshold
if it is to continue to exclude the same percentage of cases from
the tort system. 50 A pain-and-suffering dollar threshold also would
have to be adjusted for inflation in awards by judges and juries.
From the standpoint of fairness, then, perhaps the best choice
of thresholds is one which uses the nature of the injury rather than
any dollar figure to determine which cases remain in the tort system.
Although the bill which passed the United States Senate used this
approach,' 5 ' to date, only Michigan has enacted such a threshold.
5 2
4. Changing the basis for rating risks.
In the tort-liability system insurers must rate insureds accord-
ing to their "loss-causing" potential.'5 3 When setting the premium
for liability coverage, the underwriter estimates the probability that
the insured will be liable for an accident and multiplies that factor
by an estimate of the average expected loss to the third-party vic-
147. D.C. Hearings 151.
148. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 9, § 2058(2) (Supp. 1974-75); Motor Vehicle Basic Protec-
tion Act § 4.2, in BASIC PROTECTION 323; UMVARA § 5(a)(7).
149. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
150. Hawaii has a threshold which is designed to rise with inflation. HAWAII
REv. STAT. § 294-10(b) (Supp. 1974).
151. S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 206(a)(5) (1974).
152. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3135(1) (Supp. 1975-76).
153. D.C. Hearings 150.
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tims. 15 4  The amount of loss for which the insured will be legally
liable is the important factor.
Defenders of the liability system assert that it is eminently fair
in allocating the burden of accident costs. They concentrate on
post-accident equities between drivers involved in accidents, and as-
sert that the liability system penalizes the faulty driver by forcing
him to bear the cost of his own injuries and the full cost of the in-
juries that he inflicts on innocent victims. For example, Craig
Spangenberg argues that "[i]t is the purpose of the tort system to
differentiate between right and wrong, between good driving and
bad, and impose liability upon the wrongdoer for the whole loss he
inflicts."'5 Leroy Jeffers, president elect of the State Bar of Texas,
defends the Texas statute which "permits total recovery by an inno-
cent automobile accident victim from a guilty offender of the entire
amount of damages sustained."'156  Jeffers scorned the federal
threshold bill because, with respect to the below-threshold cases,
"it does not make any difference about your mental pain, and sur-
gery, [sic] or how gross and aggravated the wrongdoing of the driver
of the other car was. He goes scot-free under this enlightened re-
form measure."'
57
If we postulate an economic system in which everyone is affluent
and no one has liability insurance, this view is quite reasonable.
Such a society could and should hold culpable drivers responsible for
the consequences of their negligence. In our imperfect society,
however, few people can be without liability insurance. Only the
rich and the poor can drive uninsured. The middle class cannot
risk being forced to choose between loss of driving privileges and
bankruptcy by the financial responsibility laws which apply in the
event of an accident.' If the rich are uninsured, their victims may
still be compensated from their assets. But, if less affluent drivers
are uninsured, innocent victims are left without a source of repara-
tions. In order to close this solvency gap, financial responsibility
154. R. KEETON & P. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 531 (1971).
There have been numerous variations in methods of rating used with liability
insurance, but all have had in common the characteristic that they have dealt
with potential size of loss as a random factor. That is, they have used
average claim cost in calculating rates rather than trying to tailor a policy-
holder's rates to factors bearing on the probable size of his loss from a given
severity of injury. It is quite natural to proceed in this way since under a
liability insurance system an injured person claims against somebody else's
insurance company, not his own.
Id.
155. Spangenberg, supra note 123, at 52.
156. 1973 Senate Commerce Hearings 532-33.
157. Id. at 527.
158. See notes 42 & 102 supra.
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laws, compulsory insurance, uninsured motorists coverage, and other
devices have been developed. 5 9
The catastrophic loss potential of automobile accidents coupled
with the realities of income distribution has made reasonably priced
liability insurance a necessity. 160  Regulators influenced by public
pressure to make coverage affordable have manifested an unwilling-
ness to permit liability rates to rise to necessary levels.' 6' The
result has been rates which the industry perceives as inadequate.
Some critics have suggested that rates are adequate to produce rea-
sonable profits for the industry if investment income is considered.
Whether rates are actually inadequate is a rather insignificant aca-
demic question. The fact is that the industry is behaving as if
rates are inadequate to earn a sufficient profit. 162 The industry re-
sponse has been extreme selectivity with respect to risks in an ef-
fort to earn an underwriting profit. 63 Whether rates are held down
by regulation or by competition, selectivity with respect to risks will
increase company profits. 64 Thus, for many drivers the problem has
been not only the cost of insurance, but also its unavailability at
any price. The Department of Transportation found that "8 per-
cent or more of all drivers are unable to obtain insurance through
standard channels. In some States the substandard market ranges
as high as 20 percent." Some drivers in this substandard market
obtain insurance from high-risk specialists in the private market.
The coverage provided by such insurers is "often of questionable
quality."' 65  Subjective factors such as the race, financial status,
and personality of the insured do not enter into rate calculations;
159. For a discussion of devices designed to close the solvency gap, see BASIC
PROTECTION 109-18.
160. C. KULP & J. HALL, CASUALTY INSURANCE 420-21 (4th ed. 1968).
161. Id. at 422; MONITORING COMPETITION 62-63, 73.
162. Id. at 74. Investment income can compensate for the lack of underwriting
income in the short run, but, unless an underwriting profit is permitted, capital will
flow from the industry to other sorts of investments. Cf. Kimball, The Regulation
of Insurance, in INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY 3, 14 (S. Kimball
& H. Denenberg eds. 1969).
163. MONITORING COMPETITION 74-75; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTO-
MOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION STUDY, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES
AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES 65 (1971).
164. See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
165. INSURANCE ACCESSIBILITY 6. Insolvencies and generally poor service are
common to this latter group of insurers. Id. at 66. The other alternative is an
assigned-risk plan. In many jurisdictions, assigned-risk plans are inadequate be-
cause of eligibility restrictions, unrealistically low coverage limits, lack of premium
financing, and prices above those paid by similar risks in the voluntary market.
D. REINMUTH & G. STONE, A STUDY OF ASSIGNED RISK PLANS: REPORT OF THE
DIVISION OF INDUSTRY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 97-100 (1970).
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however, they are considered by agents when deciding whom to
cover. 166  Poor people, particularly members of racial minorities,
may be denied liability coverage in the private market because in-
surers and agents believe that they are bad drivers or because judges
and juries demonstrate a prejudice against them. Subjective factors
such as race are significant to a liability insurer because it must view
the insured as a potential defendant in a tort suit.
167
When liability insurance is a necessity, the burden of accident
costs is allocated by the insurance rating system, not by tort suits
between drivers. The courts can and do allocate costs after an
accident has occurred by applying tort rules. Insurers, however,
must allocate costs prospectively. The equitable allocation of insur-
ance costs is a near obsession in the private insurance industry.'
68
Insurance regulatory laws in all states prohibit unfair discrimina-
tion in liability insurance rates. 169  Prohibited unfair discrimination
in rates charged must be defined in terms of the relationship be-
tween the rate and the expected cost of insurance protection, not
the actual cost. A rate structure would be unfairly discriminatory
if "there are premium differences that do not correspond to ex-
pected losses and average expenses or if there are expected average
cost differences that are not reflected in premium differences."'
170
In pursuit of equity, insurers gather and apply actuarial data in
order to classify risks. Actuarial science is inexact and the compro-
mises in rating are many:
Determining relative expected costs . .. is a highly com-
plicated, technical task involving considerable judgment
and many compromises. For example, in determining
how many rating classes should exist, one must balance
the desire for a refined classification against the desire for
credible statistical information.
Even if a satisfactory compromise is reached with
respect to the number of classes of insureds, there are
many ways in which these classes can be defined. True
causal factors that would serve as a basis for these defi-
nitions are extremely difficult to identify; the compromise
with respect to the number of classes limits the number of
166. INSURANCE ACCESSIBILITY 17. An agent is stimulated to select risks care-
fully by contingency contracts and contingency commissions which make his earnings
depend in part on the losses experienced by his insureds. See J. ATHEARN, GENERAL
INSURANCE AGENCY MANAGEMENT 56-62 (1965).
167. D.C. Hearings 67.
168. See note 74 supra.
169. Williams, Price Discrimination in Property and Liability Insurance, in
INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY 209 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg
eds. 1969).
170. Id. at 212.
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causal factors that can be considered; and practical prob-
lems involved in applying the definitions cannot be ig-
nored.17
1
Basic liability insurance rates are computed by using the age, sex,
and marital status of the driver as well as his or her expected use
of the automobile to predict future costs. These factors determine
the "primary classification."' 72  Merit factors such as past accidents
and traffic violations are of lesser value for this purpose. The per-
formance characteristics of the automobile and the merit factors
considered under the "Safe Driver Insurance Plan Rule" enter into
the "secondary classification" decision resulting in an appropriate
adjustment to the basic rate.
To illustrate the relative importance of merit factors in compari-
son to the basic factors, consider the following example. A 24-
year-old male driver who owns an automobile and drives to work
would pay 1.35 times the base premium rate. If he were to be
divorced, the same driver would pay 2.20 times the base premium
rate. By contrast, if he remained married but had one chargeable
accident, his rate would be 1.75 times the base premium. In other
words, a divorce adds .85 to his rating factor while an accident
adds only .40. Switching from a standard performance car to a
high performance car would add only .30 to his rating factor. 71
When considering prior accidents for rating purposes, insurers
avoid the complexities of applying fault rules to unclear cases.
An insured is surcharged for his involvement in an accident unless
he was clearly innocent and the other party was clearly at fault.
171. Id.
172. INSURANCE RATING BOARD, PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTOMOBILE MANUAL
1(1974).
173. See id. at 6-10. The change in marital status is significant for men until
age 30 and for women until age 25. The example is cited not to attack the rationality
of the rating system but to point out the actuarial significance of an accident in com-
parison to another, nonmerit, factor. An unmarried male who owns and drives to
work a standard performance car pays 2.20 times the base premium because of his
youth and marital status if he is age 24. If he were over 30, he would have to have
had four chargeable accidents within three years to add that much to his rating factor.
Id. at 4-10.
True "merit rating" would be "a system based exclusively on individual driving
records." Flannigan & Johnson, "Merit Rating"for Automobile Liability Insurance,
619 INS. L.J. 425 (1974). It would run counter to the present trend toward more and
more rating factors and narrower and narrower refinement of classifications. Id.
Premiums could be reduced for the majority of drivers who have no accidents on their
records but very heavy surcharges on those with accidents would be necessary. Id.
at 434. Past accidents and violations are just not very good predictors of future acci-
dents. See J. Stewart & B. Campbell, The Statistical Association Between Past and
Future Accidents and Violations 30, December, 1972 (unpublished paper from the
Highway Safety Research Center, University of North Carolina).
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For example, under one plan a rating point will be assigned for post-
accident involvement unless "the insured demonstrates that the
accident occurred under [certain excepted] circumstances." No
point is charged if the insured's automobile was lawfully parked;
if the insured is reimbursed or has a judgment against the other
driver; if the insured's automobile was struck in the rear and the in-
sured was not convicted of a violation; if the other driver was con-
victed of a violation and the insured was not; or if the insured's
automobile was damaged by a hit-and-run driver and the insured re-
ported the accident within 24 hours. The burden on the fault issue
is on the insured. The rating point is assigned immediately after
the accident. If the insured is later found not to have been at fault,
the premium surcharge is refunded.
74
The achievement of equity in rating is hampered by the actuarial
necessity of large rating classes 75 and by the administrative cost of
classifying risks.'7 6  The loss-causing focus in liability insurance is
responsible for a serious rating inequity. Those who have the most
to lose will collect the most in benefits from a reparations system
so long as the objective is to compensate for pecuniary loss. Even
with respect to pain-and-suffering damages, in the liability system
the more affluent people tend to collect more. 77 An affluent person
may be a low-risk driver to his own liability insurer if he is unlikely
to be at fault in a future accident. The same person is a high risk
to the reparations system in that an injury to him would require
the system to pay more in benefits than it would pay to a person
of average income. It would seem equitable to charge a higher
premium of those who are likely to collect more from the system if
injured. This is not done in the liability system because the con-
174. INSURANCE RATING BOARD, PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTOMOBILE MANUAL
5 (1974).
175. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in
the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 495 (1961); see notes 70 & 171
supra and accompanying text.
176. In a competitive market, an individual insurer will add rate classifications
only if the addition will result in improved profits. If the cost of the additional
classification is offset by the additional business which lower rate for that group will
bring to the company, the additional classification is profitable. Unless the new clas-
sification enables the company to charge sufficiently lower premiums to some poten-
tial insureds to induce them to switch from other companies, it is not worthwhile. See
note 77 supra.
From a societal viewpoint, the cost of classification of risks is justifiable if it is offset
by a reduction in the number and cost of accidents brought about by the deterrent
effect of charging more dangerous drivers higher premiums. G. CALABRESI, THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 146-47 (Student ed. 1970); see notes 80-81 supra and accom-
panying text.
177. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
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tractual relationship exists between the insurer and the tortfeasor.
The victim pays no premium to protect himself against loss and thus
is not charged according to his loss potential.
With respect to the total reparations fund in a liability system,
the poor subsidize the more affluent who collect more when injured.
"It is basically as unfair to charge the same rate to a $5,000-a-year
and a $50,000-a-year earner as it is to charge the same total fire
insurance premium for full coverage on a $5,000 house and a
$50,000 house. Yet that is just what the liability insurance sys-
tem does. ' 178 The poor will fare much better in a first-party no-
fault insurance system. Income loss is a major portion of the pe-
cuniary loss compensable under a no-fault plan. 79  An insurer
should charge less to cover a poor person or family because there is
a lower income-loss potential. Accordingly, the Michigan insurance
commissioner has required the industry to take into account the low
income-loss potential of certain groups in filing rates under the no-
fault statute.180
Defenders of the liability system argue that another kind of sub-
sidy exists in threshold plans; innocent drivers subsidize the
guilty. 8' However, this phenomenon occurs in any insurance sys-
tem; it is the essence of insurance. Those who suffer no losses
contribute premium money which, when pooled, pays the losses of
178. P. KEETON & R. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS
531 (1971).
179. According to the Department of Transportation:
On the average, slightly more than half of all paid personal injury
economic losses to date of settlement were medical costs and about 40
percent reflected lost income. However, in small cases (e.g., where eco-
nomic losses were less than $500) medical costs loomed larger, about
two-thirds of the total, and income loss was less important accounting for
less than a third of total losses. For very serious cases (e.g., with losses
over $25,000) these relationships were reversed.
Seriously injured victims (excluding fatalities) had an average loss to date
of interview (18 to 30 months after the accident) of $4,200. Of this amount,
about 45 percent was wage loss, 38 percent medical expense, 12 percent
property damage and 5 percent other types of loss.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION
STUDY, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 34 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
180. D.C. Hearings 171.
181. For example, trial lawyer Craig Spangenberg asserts that
The tort system does not pay the driver on the wrong side of the road. It
does attempt to pay the driver on the right side of the road. A system to pay
all drivers on the wrong side of the road and drivers who crash into trees,
brick abutments and poles, that kind of system is costly, and it seems to us
wrong to say the payings [sic] of the system should come from those victims
who are on the right side of the road and give up their rights in order to pay
the fellow who hit them.
1973 Senate Commerce Hearings 388.
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those who are accident victims. In the liability system only the
guilty insureds get any tangible benefit from the policies they pur-
chased. 12 Guilty drivers in a liability insurance system pay only a
very small percentage of the loss they cause. In fact, premiums
collected from innocent drivers who have no assets to protect are
added to a pool which protects the assets of guilty drivers who are
affluent.
A no-fault threshold plan can adjust for an insured victim's care
and driving skill as reflected by his driving record as well as his
income-loss potential.'83 The liability system takes into account only
the first factor. 84  Predictions about the likelihood of future acci-
dents can be made in a no-fault system in the same way that they
are made in a fault system. The same rating factors can be used.
Presumptive fault criteria now used in surcharging for accidents
could be retained. For example, drivers whose cars are rear-ended
or damaged while parked need not be surcharged. Criminal con-
victions could still be used. The use of civil liability in the rating
process, however, would preserve much of the cost of the fault-
determining process. Rating criteria based upon tort judgments or
settlements should be eliminated.' 8 5 Keeton and O'Connell prefer
a system which uses involvement rating rather than one which ignores
accident records or which surcharges only those drivers found to be
at fault. To them the cost of assigning fault for rating purposes
may be prohibitive. In any event, they argue that rating is a sepa-
rable collateral issue in relation to the desirability of their threshold
plan.
186
In addition to a reduction in the subsidy to the affluent, the shift
182. P. KEETON & R. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS
528 (1971). Of course, one of the principal values of insurance is intangible. In-
surance "provides the policyholder with a sense of security, a feeling of confidence
about the future, a freedom from anxiety about parts of the unknown." Kimball,
supra note 175, at 478.
183. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, AFTER CARS CRASH 89-91 (1967).
184. Id. at 90.
185. See notes 172-74 supra and accompanying text.
186. BASIC PROTECTION 269 & n.28, 526.
Obviously, if a no-fault plan charged everyone the same premium or simply re-
lated premiums to income level, the low-risk drivers would be subsidizing the high-
risk drivers. D. OLSON, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
AND COMPENSATION STUDY, THE PRICE AND AVAILABILITY OF AUTOMOBILE LI-
ABILITY INSURANCE IN THE NONSTANDARD MARKET 30-31 n.2 (1971). Because poor
people tend to dominate the high-risk classifications, this could be beneficial to the
poor as a class. See note 94 supra. All enacted plans and proposed plans under ser-
ious consideration will permit loss-causing propensity to enter into rate calculations.




to a loss-incurring focus in rating offers another important advan-
tage. Ratemaking in the liability system is complicated by the
availablity of pain-and-suffering damages and by the fact that the po-
tential victim is a random third party and not the insured. The
change to a first-party system which pays benefits for pecuniary
loss only, would make predicting losses much less complicated and
more accurate. 8 7  Assuming that there is a considerable overlap
between the class of drivers who are high risks and the class of
187. Testimony of Dr. John L. Hazard, Assistant Secretary for Policy and Inter-
national Affairs, Department of Transportation, in D.C. Hearings 19. According
to Frederick D. Watkins, president of Aetna Life & Casualty Company:
Today, sharp fluctuations in losses make the insurer's position too precar-
ious to tolerate premium levels based on narrow or non-existent profit mar-
gins and require the application of long-range trend factors in the pricing
computation. Under a first-party system, however, we would be able to
predict losses with greater degree of accuracy. Thus we would be in a better
position to develop adequate rates based on moderate but realistic profit
margins, avoiding the violent swings that have characterized our business for
the past ten years.
[Tihe liability system itself makes it necessary for insurers to try to iden-
tify and insure only the best drivers-those likely to escape accident involve-
ment-in order to avoid the unpredictable costs of accidents involving un-
known third parties and their automobiles.
[A] no-fault system would lead to expansion of the automobile in-
surance market. Underwriting standards would be significantly changed.
An individual's driving record would still be significant, but so would his in-
come, the size of his family, the kind of car he drives. These are predictable
factors, with assignable values. In short, insurers would be able to figure
more accurately the costs of the risks they assume, and, in a free and compet-
itive market-place, would be able to offer coverage to virtually all licensed
drivers.
1971 House Commerce Hearings, pt. I, at 252-53.
Because of the greater number of random variables in the liability system, the dis-
persion of probable losses in that system is greater than in a no-fault system. This
means that losses may be predicted with greater accuracy in the no-fault system. Pre-
dictions for the whole insured class and for individual members of the class are more
likely to be accurate. The need for what is referred to as a contingency loading - an
increase in the premium to cover the uncertainty of the prediction - is reduced or
eliminated in a no-fault system. Of course, the maximum improvement in the accur-
acy of loss predictions will occur only if tort liability is completely abolished. Thresh-
old plans will improve predictions to a lesser extent and add-on plans will have no
effect because liability is preserved in every case.
One of the reasons for the difficulty in predicting losses in the liability system is the
length of time required to resolve the issues of fault and the amount of pain-and-
suffering damages. The insurer must predict not only the future losses but future
costs of settling the claims as well. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION STUDY, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND
THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES 63-64 (1971); cf. Hofflander, Minimum
Capital and Surplus Requirements for Multiple Line Insurance Companies: A New
Approach, in INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY 69, 78-79 (S. Kimball
& H. Denenberg eds. 1969).
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drivers who have low incomes, 00 this should result in a narrowing
of the range of premiums from the lowest- to highest-rated drivers
and in generally lower underwriting costs.8 9 It should also substan-
tially reduce the pressure for extreme selectivity with respect to
risks.190
Two factors should tend to reduce the pressure for selectivity
if a threshold plan is enacted. First, the cost savings inherent in a
threshold plan, except perhaps one with very high benefit levels,
should make possible premium reductions. In open-competition
states, companies which reduce premiums to a lesser extent than
their competitors may lose some customers. However, if the liability
system remained unchanged and prices rose, consumers would seem
even more likely to shop for cheaper coverage. In states which
have retained prior-approval laws or other direct regulation of rates,
the political situation of the insurance commissioner will be consid-
erably changed. For years he has been under pressure to hold back
rising premiums. With the change to no-fault, he will be urged to
reduce premiums to the full extent possible. A commissioner con-
cerned about the viability of the insurance market and the availabil-
ity of insurance to all drivers will find it much easier to reduce
rates to a level which permits a reasonable profit than he found it
to raise them to that level. In other words, the industry can get
the effect of a rate increase and improved profits by lowering rates
so long as the rate reduction does not eat up the entire cost savings
inherent in a threshold plan. The combination of a high threshold
and a low no-fault benefit level offers the best prospect for reducing
the total dollars paid out by the system and facilitates a substantial
reduction in premiums while still improving insurer profits.' 9'
188. Although accurate data are not available, the assumption is commonly ac-
cepted and not unreasonable. See note 94 supra.
189. See note 187 supra.
190. According to one insurance executive, this would be true because of the re-
duced variation in losses from year to year and because of the improved predicta-
bility of losses. 1971 House Commerce Hearings, pt. 1, at 252-53. Actually,
selectivity is a response to rate inadequacy in a competitive market and is likely to
continue, even under a no-fault system, unless rates are high enough to provide insur-
ers with what they consider a reasonable profit. See notes 75-76 supra and accom-
panying text; cf. C. CULP & J. HALL, CASUALTY INSURANCE 448-52 (4th ed. 1968).
191. Massachusetts' experience with a law which has a moderate threshold level,
$500 of medical expense or certain specific injuries, is instructive. The benefit level
under the Massachusetts plan is quite modest. The required no-fault coverage has a
$2,000 limit. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34A (Supp. 1975). The decline in
dollars paid out to victims after the changeover was startling. Despite rate reductions
ordered by the insurance commissioner totaling 38 percent, insurers in Massachusetts
improved their profits quite substantially in the first year of the no-fault law. Brain-
ard, The Impact of No-Fault on the Underwriting Results of Massachusetts Insurers,
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The second factor which would reduce the pressure for careful selec-
tion of risks is the consideration of the loss-incurring potential of
the insured. The response of insurers to inadequate rates has been
twofold: (1) a narrowing of rate classes and (2) careful selection of
policyholders within such classes. A system which considers both
the probability of an accident and the size of the victim's potential
loss will necessarily have narrower classes. In other words, the need
to consider factors which help make the estimate of accident proba-
bility more accurate will be reduced because the amount of loss
can be more accurately estimated. Furthermore, subjective factors
which have been used in selection of risks will be less relevant.
19 2
Finally, because of the improved accuracy of predictions, the cost
of more sophisticated, detailed classifications and underwriting
guides is less likely to be justified by the improvement in the ac-
curacy of the prediction.'93
Although the changeover in rating to a loss-incurring focus would
have some benefits for the nonpoor, it is probable that poor people
who are now rated as high risks will benefit most from the change.
194
Obviously, the maximum impact of the shift from the loss-causing to
loss-incurring focus will occur only in a pure no-fault system.195
Although that goal seems unattainable, representatives of the poor
can choose among the various plans with this factor in mind. They
should support those plans which minimize post-accident loss shift-
ing on a fault basis. Threshold plans eliminate the direct shifting
of loss from victim to tortfeasor for those cases below the threshold.
The higher the threshold, the better the plan will serve to concentrate
the rating process on loss-incurring potential.
196
Unfortunately, many of the enacted threshold plans retain post-
accident loss shifting for below-threshold cases even though the vic-
tim has no tort action against the tortfeasor. 197  The victim's in-
44 Miss. L.J. 174 (1973). In such a situation the insurance commissioner must allow
the industry reasonable profits to provide for a healthy, competitive market. He
must also be wary of the potential for windfall profits. One means of preventing
such a windfall without relying on the commissioner is to set benefit levels so high
that the full cost savings will be redistributed as no-fault payments to victims and not
as reduced premiums. The possibility of inadequate premium reduction would thus
be eliminated. A plan seems unlikely to be politically attractive, however, unless it
offers a prospect of reduced premiums. See note 41 supra; cf. Keeton, Compensa-
tion Systems and Utah's No-Fault Statute, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 383, 398.
192. See notes 166-67 supra and accompanying text.
193. See G. CALABRESI, THE CosTs oF ACCIDENTS 60-64 (Student ed. 1970).
194. See note 181 supra and accompanying text.
195. See D.C. Hearings 216.
196. Id.
197. In this respect Kansas has the worst of the enacted plans. Even where the
victim has no right to sue for pain-and-suffering damages his insurer may collect from
1975]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
surer is permitted to recover the amount paid in no-fault benefits
from the tortfeasor's liability insurer. It is unusual to permit an
insurer to pursue a claim as a sort of subrogee even though the
right of the subrogor-victim has been abolished. Most plans do not
use case-by-case adjudication through the courts. They set up a
system for shifting losses en masse; any disputes are adjudicated
by arbitration. The basis for such loss-cost-transfer, however, is
traditional tort law.' 98 Thus, although such plaAs may substantially
reduce the administrative cost of iiposing the burden on the tort-
feasor through the courts, they will generate more administrative
costs than plans which permit no shifting on a fault basis.1 99
the tortfeasor's liability insurer. This means that both the victim and the tortfeasor
must pay a premium to cover the victim's loss. Because of the cost of shifting the
losses, the no-fault rate will not fully reflect the recoveries from tortfeasors. In
Kansas, the shifting may be done by expensive case-by-case subrogation. KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3113, 40-3117 (Supp. 1974).
Several states permit transfer of all pecuniary loss where the victim has no tort
claim but require that the shifting be done through a less expensive arbitration system.
E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 674 (McKinney Supp. 1974-75); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3405b(d)
(Supp. 1974). Colorado's statute is similar but less objectionable because only losses
in excess of $500 may be shifted. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-713(1), 10-4-717(1)
(1973).
Some states allow pecuniary loss to be shifted from the no-fault insurer to the li-
ability insurer only in cases where the victim would have a right to pain-and-suffering
damages. This obviously reduces the number of cases in which pecuniary loss is
shifted. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.736(3), 627.737 (1972). The Hawaii statute
also permits transfer only in above-threshold cases. However, it provides that only
50 percent of the loss may be shifted and therefore is less objectionable. HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 294-7 (Supp. 1974).
For poor people, the best plans prohibit all shifting of pecuniary losses covered by
no-fault benefits. Michigan and Pennsylvania have adopted this approach. MicI.
COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3116, 500.3135; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.111(a)
(Supp. 1975-76). Both the Uniform Act and S. 354 take this approach. UMVARA §§
5, 38; S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § I ll(a)(1)(B) (1974).
The poor should support provisions which provide for loss-shifting based upon the
weight of the vehicle or other loss-causing propensities not based on fault. E.g.,
UMVARA § 38; S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 11 l(a)(3) (1974). They should not ob-
ject to provisions granting a lien or subrogation rights to a no-fault insurer when the
victim has a right to collect pecuniary loss from a person not covered by automobile
insurance. E.g., N.Y. INs. LAW § 673.2 (McKinney Supp. 1974-75); UMVARA §
6(b); S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 11l(a)(2) (1974). Unless the no-fault insurer is
given a lien or subrogation rights, the insured will be able to recover his pecuniary
loss twice. This feature coordinates benefits to minimize the cost of no-fault coverage.
198. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3405b(d) (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.53
(Supp. 1975-76); N.Y. INs. LAW § 674 (McKinney Supp. 1974-75); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31-41-11 (Repl. vol. 4A 1974).
199. Harry A. Lansman, executive vice president of the Kemper Insurance Group,
cited data with respect to the loss-cost-transfer system which provides for arbitration
of intercompany disputes over fault in collision coverage cases. That data indicate
that on the whole claimants won about half of the time and lost about half of the time
in the arbitrated cases. 1973 Senate Commerce Hearings 241. It would seem,
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Furthermore, they will preserve the inequities of the loss-causing
rating system.20 0  Risks will continue to be viewed as potential
causes of loss to the insurer because of legal liability. The affluent
who are good risks in terms of potential liability will continue to be
subsidized by the poor.
20
'
Strong elements in the insurance industry are dedicated to the
preservation of loss-causing rating.202  Although they may argue the
equities, they act upon the realities of the present market situation.
Companies which have prospered in the liability system because
of their ability to select the best liability risks may suffer if the
rating focus shifts. They will have a disproportionate number of
high-income earners in their pools, causing rates to rise. Companies
that have been serving large numbers of poor people could benefit
from the shift. Most important, companies that are just entering
the market on a large scale could select the insureds who would
be most attractive under the new system-good drivers with low in-
comes.
Given the position of a large. and powerful segment of the in-
surance industry and the concurrence of a bar which supports the
preservation of fault wherever and however possible, the elimination
of loss-cost-transfer seems politically unlikely. The power of these
select-risk companies and the survival of the belief that loss-causing
rating is somehow fairer, has led to preservation of loss-cost-transfer
therefore, that the costs could have been allowed to remain on the companies which
paid the collision claims since their insureds were guilty half of the time and innocent
half of the time. The recoveries were approximately offset by the dollars required to
be paid out. If such trading of dollars among companies were costless, it might be
justifiable. Professor Reinmuth estimates, however, that the arbitration system costs
for 1971 amounted to about 2.5 percent of the amount awarded and that more signif-
icant costs were incurred by the companies to investigate fault and prepare their
claims or defenses. D.C. Hearings 172. He further contends that personal injury
cases are more complex and therefore more expensive to investigate and arbitrate
than collision claims. Id.
200. Id. at 171, 173. According to Professor Reinmuth:
The retention of subrogation will also perpetuate the selective underwriting
standards of insurance companies. The burden of such selective liability un-
derwriting standards will continue to be felt by urban dwellers, the young,
the elderly, the blacks or unmarried. Such are traditionally perceived by in-
surance companies as "high risk" under a liability system and would continue
to be under a no-fault system which retains subrogation.
Id. at 171.
201. See notes 177-80 supra and accompanying text.
202. For example, at the Camelback meeting, the companies agreed that a no-
fault threshold plan should be enacted but that loss costs should be transferred to the
fault insurer whenever a claim for pain and suffering exists, no-fault benefits paid
exceed $1500, or one of the vehicles exceeds 5,000 pounds unloaded. 1973 Senate
Commerce Hearings 157-60; see note 39 supra.
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in varying forms in most states which have enacted threshold
plans.20 3
As a secondary position, representatives of the poor should op-
pose any system which shifts losses on a case-by-case basis through
the courts by the traditional, and very expensive, subrogation meth-
od. They will want the least expensive system and should insist
that minor cases be excluded entirely from the loss-cost-transfer
system. As in the threshold debate, the issue will then be the defi-
nition of a minor case. Representatives of the poor will want to
eliminate as many cases as possible.20 4
In addition to loss-cost-transfer among insurers, threshold plans
preserve tort liability for pecuniary loss in excess of the no-fault
coverage limits.2 0 5  If no-fault benefits are not adequate, the victim
is permitted to collect his excess loss through the tort system. A
decision about excess pecuniary loss is necessary because none of the
plans covers income and replacement-services loss without limit,
and nearly all limit medical coverage. Only the Uniform Act and
S. 354 provide unlimited medical benefits.20 6 Once it has been de-
cided that required coverage of such losses should be limited, there
are two basic options. First, victims could absorb excess losses.
They would be unable to recover such losses through the tort system
and would remain free to choose whether to purchase some sort of
additional no-fault insurance protection. Second, victims could be
permitted to shift such losses to a tortfeasor where liability might
be established.
203. See note 197 supra.
204. Both the Uniform Act and S. 354 virtually eliminate fault-based transfer of
loss costs from no-fault insurers to liability insurers. UMVARA § 6(a); S. 354, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 Il(a)(l) (1974). In the few cases in which the victim has a tort
claim for the same loss which was covered by no-fault benefits, the insurer is given a
lien on the recovery to the extent of the benefits it has paid. UMVARA § 6(b); S.
354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 l1(a)(2) (1974). Only a few states have taken this re-
strictive approach to loss-cost-transfer. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-325 (Supp.
1975), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3116 (Supp. 1975), NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 698.290 (1973). The effect of such provisions is to eliminate tort claims by insurers
in all cases in which the insured victim himself would have no claim.
Many threshold plans undermine the abolition of tort liability by permitting insurers
to continue to shift losses based on fault even where the victim would have no right to
do so. Georgia and New York are typical in permitting a no-fault insurer to shift its
loss to a fault insurer through an arbitration system in any case in which liability can
be shown. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3405b(d) (Supp. 1974); N.Y. INS. LAW § 674
(McKinney Supp. 1974-75). Others permit the shifting only if the amount involved
exceeds a certain amount. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ I0-4-713(1), 10-4-717 (1973)
($500). Obviously statutes like that of Colorado are preferable to the Georgia or
New York type. The higher the dollar threshold the fewer the cases which could
result in shifting.
205. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-714(2) (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737
(1972); N.Y. INS. LAW § 673 (McKinney Supp. 1974-75).
206. S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 204(a) (1974); UMVARA § 13, Comment.
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With respect to income loss, the poor will seldom suffer loss
exceeding the coverage limits. On the other hand, the affluent are
very likely to incur such excess loss. In most plans, tort liability
is preserved for such losses even where the serious injury threshold
for pain and suffering is not reached. In effect, a judgment is made
that a case involving excess economic loss is a serious case. For
example, in the Uniform Act tort liability is preserved in one sub-
section for excess economic loss and in another for pain-and-suf-
fering damages in serious cases.20 7 Connecticut is exceptional in
barring such suits unless the pain-and-suffering threshold is met.20 8
If such excess-loss suits are common, the poor will be paying
liability premiums to cover the losses of the rich just as they did
under the previous liability system. Unless benefits are set too low,
few tort claims for excess pecuniary loss will be filed because most
will involve only small amounts of money. The number of cases
which exceed aggregate benefit limits will be small and if the weekly
income benefit limit is set at $200, few victims will lose substantial
amounts in excess of that limit.20 9 However, claims will be made in
conjunction with claims for pain and suffering in the above-threshold
cases.
If the subsidy of the rich by the poor is to be eliminated, excess
pecuniary loss must not be recoverable in tort. Once each motorist
has purchased the basic no-fault coverage, he should be free to buy
added no-fault coverage for his additional loss potential. The af-
fluent should not have the option of attempting to shift such losses
through the tort system. If compulsory spreading of these losses
through insurance is desired, it should be done through no-fault
coverage. The basic limits could be either increased or eliminated.
Insurers should then be required to rate insureds on the basis of
their actual loss potential rather than the policy limits. Otherwise,
poor people might pay for coverage they would never use.2 ' ° Al-
ternatively, each insured could be required to insure himself up to
the full amount of his income when the policy is purchased. How-
ever, such a requirement would force the purchase of automobile
insurance where a broader health and accident policy is what is
needed. It would also involve substantial administrative costs.
The argument for compulsory insurance is weak with respect to the
207. UMVARA § 5(a), (b).
208. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-323(a) (Supp. 1975).
209. Compare the argument made by add-on plan proponents that many small
pain-and-suffering claims will not be filed once victims are compensated for their
out-of-pocket loss. See notes 129-30 supra and accompanying text.
210. See notes 230-32 infra and accompanying text.
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affluent; however, there is no practical way to force the poor to in-
211sure without also forcing the rich to buy the basic coverage.
Clearly the best option for the poor is the abolition of tort lia-
bility for excess pecuniary loss. There should be no objection on
constitutional grounds. 21 2  Such a feature might be less desirable if
medical loss coverage were substantially limited. It would leave
many poor people with excess pecuniary loss and no source of repa-
rations.21 3  None of the enacted plans has abolished tort liability
for excess loss, but S. 354 and the Uniform Act would eliminate
many excess-loss cases by means of threshold requirements. Under
S. 354, only economic loss in excess of the aggregate benefit limit
is recoverable.21 4 The Uniform Act permits recovery of only that ex-
cess loss which is incurred after six months of disability. 2 5  The
use of threshold criteria would eliminate the excess-loss claims of
the affluent who are not seriously injured. The more restrictive the
threshold, the better the plan will be for the poor.
III. No-FAULT BENEFITS: PROVIDING ECONOMIC
SECURITY FOR THE POOR
A. The Problem of the Noncontributing Victim
In designing a no-fault plan, perhaps the most important step is
choosing the nature and level of benefits to be provided. A plan
which covers all sorts of loss, both pecuniary and nonpecuniary, and
which has a high level of benefits will cost more than one with more
modest benefits. Likewise, a plan which covers all victims will be
somewhat more expensive than one which excludes certain victims.
211. Blum & Kalven, Ceilings, Costs, and Compulsion in Auto Compensation Leg-
islation, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 341, 351-52.
212. In Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973), the Florida Supreme Court held
that a provision of the Florida law abolishing tort liability for damage to automobiles
in certain cases without substituting a no-fault right was unconstitutional. The court,
applying a state constitutional provision guaranteeing access to courts for redress of
injury, held that the state had failed to show "an overpowering public necessity" for
eliminating the tort right without substituting an alternative. Id. at 4-5. The argu-
ment was rejected in Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971) which up-
held the Massachusetts no-fault law and on at least two occasions by the United
States Supreme Court. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929) (guest statute); New
York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
213. See note 225 infra and accompanying text.
214. S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 204(b)(2), 206(a)(4) (1974). Plans typically
permit suits for loss in excess of weekly income limits. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 500.3135(2)(c) (Supp. 1975-76); N.Y. INs. LAW § 673 (McKinney Supp.
1974-75). Even Connecticut, which permits recovery of excess economic loss only
in cases which meet the pain-and-suffering threshold requirements, authorizes recov-
ery of all loss in excess of the weekly income limit. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-320(e),
-323(a), -325(b) (Supp. 1975).
215. UMVARA § 5(a)(6).
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No-fault plans commonly exclude persons guilty of various kinds
of misconduct from benefits. For example, some states exclude a
person who uses a car in the commission of a felony, engages in
drunken driving or intentionally injures himself 21 6 Although other
means of deterring such conduct might be more effective and desir-
able, this class of victims usually engenders little sympathy from
legislators. The exclusion based upon misconduct applies even to
those who have contributed to the insurance fund. Of course, in-
surance generally does not cover loss one intentionally causes one-
self since such a loss is not fortuitous.217
The largest and most important class of victims who might be
excluded from coverage is the class of noncontributing victims. The
class may be divided into two subclasses: the "culpable," who were
required to insure themselves but failed to do so, and the "inno-
cent," who were not required to insure. Both subclasses are likely
to be dominated by the poor.
Whatever the means of compelling insurance, there will always
be some car owners who are uninsured at the time of an accident.
The issue remains whether no-fault benefits should be withheld as one
penalty for driving while uninsured. Nearly all jurisdictions have
218favored this sanction. Accordingly, poor people who cannot af-
ford coverage or who let policies lapse because of financial prob-
lems are denied the benefits which they need more than anyone else.
The second subclass of noncontributing victims presents a dif-
ferent problem. These victims are noncontributors because they
neither own cars nor live in households which do own cars. The
poorest of the poor predominate in this group.219 Most plans pro-
tect these victims when they are injured in an accident involving an
insured vehicle.220  However, some plans fail to cover them when
injured by a hit-skip vehicle or by one which is uninsured.22' Al-
216. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(2)(b) (1972) (intentional injury, drunken
driving, commission of felony); N.Y. INS. LAW § 672.2 (McKinney Supp. 1974-75) (in-
tentional injury, drunken driving, commission of felony, racing, operating or riding
in stolen car); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-41-10(b) (1974) (intentional injury, commission
of felony).
217. R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 5.3, at 278 (1971).
218. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-321 (Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736
(4)(d) 4 (1972) (threshold states); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4016 (Supp. 1973); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(a)(2)(c) (Supp. 1974) (add-on states).
219. See note 16 supra.
220. E.g., HAWAII REv. STAT. § 294-4(l)(A) (Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-3109(a) (4) (Supp. 1974) (threshold states); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539 (Supp.
1974); ORE. REv. STAT. § 743.800 (1973) (add-on plans).
221. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-4-701 to 104-723 (1973); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 56-3401b to 56-3413b (Supp. 1974) (threshold plans); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
21, § 2118 (1974); TEX. INS. CODE art. 5.06-3 (Supp. 1974) (add-on plans).
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though many people in this group are likely to be on welfare, the
class should be covered by an assigned-claims plan222 to make cer-
tain that all victims have access to the same benefits.
The interests of the poor will be best served by a plan which per-
mits both culpable and innocent noncontributing victims to recover
no-fault benefits. In order to minimize the costs which must be im-
posed upon insured motorists, some of whom are poor, vehicle
registration requirements and sanctions should be used to compel all
motorists to insure.223 The Uniform Act and S. 354 both take this
approach.224
B. The Nature and Level of Benefits.
Adequate medical benefits are of critical importance to poor
people because they may mean the difference between full rehabili-
tation and permanent disability. The affluent often may have other
resources to obtain the treatment they need; the poor must depend
on their no-fault coverage. The affluent will be able to pay medical
bills and await reimbursement, while the poor will have to find doc-
tors and other health care providers willing to treat them and wait
for payment. The poor therefore have more interest in plan fea-
tures designed to promote prompt, efficient payment of medical
bills.225
Because they may determine the extent of other losses, medical
benefits are the most important part of the benefit package. In
order to finance good medical benefits the poor should press for a
high tort threshold 226 and should be willing to settle for less with re-
spect to other benefits.227
Income benefits must be scrutinized carefully to avoid unfair
treatment of the poor. A periodic limit, weekly or monthly, is nec-
essary in addition to an aggregate limit on income benefits. If an
aggregate limit alone is employed, the poor person will recover far
less than an affluent person suffering the same period of disability.
In theory, it should be possible to adjust premiums to take into ac-
count the fact that the affluent will lose far more during a shorter
period of disability. The periodic limit makes the rating process
222. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-339 (Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 698.380 (1973) (threshold plans); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.131 (Supp. 1974) (add-
on plan).
223. See notes 44-54 supra and accompanying text.
224. S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 108(a), 203(a) (1974); UMVARA §§ 2(a), 7(j), 18,37.
225. See notes 125-28 supra and accompanying text.
226. See notes 113-24 supra and accompanying text.
227. See notes 228-49 infra and accompanying text.
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simpler and less expensive. The insurer need only predict the likely
period of disability for all insureds, regardless of income, and mul-
tiply that figure by the periodic limit to arrive at the predicted in-
come loss. In this way low-income earners can be fully covered for
long-term disability without fully covering the short-term loss of
persons with very high earnings at the same time.228 Although most
plans have adopted a periodic limit in combination with an aggre-
gate limit, a disturbing number have not.
22 9
The poor should pay for no more than they expect to receive in
income benefits. That is, rating must reflect income-loss poten-
tial.230  There are two ways to force companies to rate the poor
fairly. The first is to set the income benefit level for compulsory
coverage so low that most poor motorists will normally earn that
amount. Companies can be expected to rate on the basis of the
maximum loss, the amount of the policy limit. A weekly income
benefit level of $100 would be more desirable than the commonly
used level of $200.211 If the weekly or monthly benefit maximum
is set low enough, few poor motorists will be compelled to pay for
coverage they may never use. But setting a low limit has the dis-
advantage of compelling less than full coverage for those in the
upper portion of the low-income group. A second option is to set
the benefit level higher and to mandate consideration of actual income-
loss potential in the rating process. This has been done by the in-
surance commissioner in Michigan2 32 but could also be accomplished by
statute. Representatives of the poor should settle for the latter
option because it allows for full coverage of the whole class of low-
income motorists while offering some assurance that the poorest of
the poor will not be overcharged.
Because income benefits are not taxable no-fault plans usually
pay less than actual income loss. Plan costs can be minimized with
228. Blum & Kalven, supra note 211, at 350-51.
229. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4014(b) (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.1-380.1(b) (Supp. 1975) (add-on states); N.Y. INs. LAW § 671.1(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1974-75); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3107(b) (Supp. 1975-76).
Some states have no periodic limit. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(a) (1972)
(threshold state); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(a)(2) (Supp. 1974) (add-on state).
See Appendix A for a listing of periodic limits in the enacted statutes.
230. See note 180 supra and accompanying text.
231. The S200 level is the most common one in threshold plans. E.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-320(e) (Supp. 1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3403b(b)(2) (Supp.
1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.44.3 (Supp. 1975-76).
Several of the states have used a lower limit. E.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-4-706(d)(I) (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3103(b) (Supp. 1974); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 39:6A-4b (1973).
232. See note 180 supra and accompanying text.
1975]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
no disadvantage to victims if benefits equal income loss after taxes.
Most plans pay only a fixed percentage of the gross income loss in
calculating benefits. 233  However, some allow the victim to show
that the actual difference between his gross and net income is smaller
than the percentage set by statute.234 Unless such a mechanism is
provided, the lowest income earners will collect less in benefits than
their actual net income loss because they are in the lowest tax
brackets. The difference in benefits to individuals will be small be-
cause of the low level at which such percentage-reduction standards
usually are set. If the figure is too low, the affluent will be recovering
more than their actual net income loss. The best solution is to set
the percentage at a figure which is fair for most people and then per-
mit the poor to show that the percentage is too high in individual
cases.
Replacement-services benefits are designed to compensate real,
but difficult-to-measure, economic loss. Without such a benefit
threshold plans which eliminate compensation for dignitary loss
would pay only medical benefits to the poor who earn no income.235
The common law permitted victims to recover for the value of the
impairment in their earning capacity as well as for income loss.
With respect to impairment of earning capacity, the issue is "what
the plaintiff would have been capable of earning had the injury not
occurred. 236  Keeton and O'Connell decided to avoid the problem
of valuing loss of earning capacity and to cover only actual income
loss as it accrues as well as the cost of substitute household services
which are more readily measurable.237  Their view has been almost
unanimously accepted in the enacted and proposed plans. 238 Dis-
ability of an unemployed person can cause a serious economic loss
to his family in the form of the loss of services he regularly per-
forms in the home. A grandmother who lives with her daughter
and takes care of the grandchildren while the daughter works is a
good example. If replacement-services benefits are included in the
no-fault plan, the grandmother's disability would be compensable to
233. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4014(b) (Supp. 1973) (70 percent of gross);
N.Y. INS. LAW § 671.2(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974-75) (gross minus 20 percent);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-41-6(1)(b) (Repl. vol. 4A 1974) (85 percent of gross).
234. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 304.39-120 (1974); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 500.3107(b) (Supp. 1975-76); S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 208(b) (1974).
235. Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem-
Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 673-74 (1964).
236. J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY: PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH
ACTIONS § 59, at 97 (1972).
237. See BASIC PROTECTION 399-400.
238. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3107(b) (Supp. 1975-76); N.Y. INS.
LAW §§ 671.1(b)-(c) (McKinney Supp. 1974-75); UMVARA §§ 1(a)(5) (ii)-(iii).
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some extent. Unfortunately, nearly all of the statutes contain
replacement-services benefits which are not well-adapted to the
realities of life for the poor. Few low-income families could afford
to hire someone to perform all the services the grandmother formerly
provided. Yet, they must actually incur the expense of substitute
services in order to recover benefits.239 Under such plans, poor
people are not likely to get what they pay for in replacement-
services coverage.
Measuring the economic loss caused by the grandmother's dis-
ability by the cost of substitute services is not sound economics. An
economist would value a housewife's services at
[T]he price that her time would have commanded in an al-
ternative use. . . . Courts do not use the opportunity cost
concept in determining damages in such cases, but they
approximate it by allowing testimony of the quality of the
housewife's household services. This is an oblique method
of avoiding the pitfall of valuing such services at the cost of
240domestic services.
Moreover, the loss is suffered whether or not substitute services are
obtained. The poor are the group least likely to obtain substitute
services and to keep adequate records of them. If they are to re-
ceive full value for the premium cost of the replacement-services
benefits, a different method must be used to determine loss. One
way out of the dilemma is to accept the loss as a real economic loss
but to eliminate the problem of proof and the costs of determining
the amount by simply setting a dollar figure for such loss to be
used in all cases. Apparently the only jurisdiction to adopt this
strategy is Utah.241 A minimum figure, possibly $10 per day, could
be set as part of the compulsory insurance package with higher
coverage limits available for those who desired more protection.
Questions concerning the actual value of such loss would be elim-
inated and the company would pay the policy limit whenever dis-
ability was established. With payments made periodically rather
than in a lump sum and with a relatively low per-day limit for the
coverage, the problem of malingering would be minimized.242 Un-
239. E.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 743.805(2)(b) (1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.111
(Supp. 1974) (add-on plans); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 294-2(10)(D) (Supp. 1974);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3107 (b) (Supp. 1975-76) (threshold plans).
240. R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.10, at 79-80 (1972).
241. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-41-6(l)(b)(ii) (1974).
242. This could be accomplished in the same way it would be done with respect
to the income-loss coverage. The Uniform Act has provisions designed to help
insurers in gathering information about a claimant's condition. UMVARA §§ 32,
33. It also permits reduction or termination of future benefits when a claimant
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less this sort of strategy is adopted, the poor should oppose re-
placement-services coverage as a part of the compulsory insurance
package because it will cost them more than it will be worth to them.
Some threshold plans abolish tort liability for damage to the
automobile of another.2 43  However, requiring a no-fault substitute,
collision insurance, could increase premiums for the compulsory
insurance enough to offset the full cost savings on the personal
injury coverage. 4  Collision insurance is generally a bad bargain245
and is especially so for poor people driving old and inadequately
maintained cars. To the extent that higher income earners drive
more valuable cars, the affluent will collect more from the liability
system than they pay in and the poor will collect less. 246  Com-
pelling collision coverage would increase the premiums for the
compulsory insurance package and would provide the poor with
benefits they need far less than better medical or income benefits.
The elimination of tort liability for damage to automobiles, at least
in minor cases, will help reduce the subsidy of the affluent by the
poor. Admittedly, there will be some poor families who spend a
large portion of their income on an expensive car who seemingly
might suffer serious, uncompensated loss. Those families, however,
need not be compelled by the no-fault plan to buy collision coverage.
Lending institutions typically require collision and comprehensive
coverage as a condition of financing. Thus, the poor should prefer
unreasonably refuses treatment or rehabilitation. Id. § 34(d). The small amounts
of money involved in replacement-services benefits might lead to carelessness in
checking such claims. However, the small amounts and the periodicity of pay-
ments would be unattractive to the professionals in insurance fraud.
243. For example, Michigan abolished all negligence claims for damage to cars.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3123(I)(a), .3135 (Supp. 1975-76). Michigan does
have strict tort liability for damage to property, including parked cars, caused by
cars, and insurance coverage is required. Id. §§ 500.3121, .3123. Florida abolished
tort liability for damage to cars amounting to less than $550. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 627.738(5) (1972). That provision was held unconstitutional in Kluger v. White,
281 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973). The Uniform Act also abolishes tort liability for damage
to a car. UMVARA § 5(a)(4).
244. The threshold plan enacted by Massachusetts substantially reduced the
cost of personal injury coverage. That reduction was offset by the cost of optional
collision insurance which became a necessity when tort liability for damage to cars
was abolished. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 90, § 340 (Supp. 1975); Kenney, A
Pilgrim's Progress-Three Years of No-Fault in Massachusetts, 10 THE FORUM 129,
135 (1974).
245. According to Dean Cowen, chairman of the Committee on the Uniform
Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act of the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, the Uniform Act did not require collision insurance
because it is the "worst buy" on the insurance market, meaning that it is very
expensive in relation to benefits it provides. D.C. Hearings 161.




plans which eliminate tort claims for damage to automobiles in
most cases without requiring collision insurance as a substitute.
In jurisdictions where constitutional provisions prevent abolition of
tort liability without a substitute remedy, compulsory collision
coverage would be preferable to liability coverage.
Probably the most difficult judgment representatives of the poor
must make concerns the overall benefit limit. An unlimited-benefit
plan which would provide full pecuniary-loss coverage to all victims
is likely to cost more than the liability system costs, despite its
recognized deficiencies.247 A very few catastrophically injured vic-
tims suffer an incredibly high proportion of the total economic loss
caused by auto accidents. According to the Department of Trans-
portation study, about 9 percent of all victims suffered over $25,000
in economic loss; however, those victims suffered about 67 percent
of the total economic loss. 248  Seriously injured victims who re-
ceived less than full compensation for economic losses from the
tort system represented less than .05 percent of the population in
the year of the study and a surprisingly small number of those
victims suffered substantial hardships.249 The desire to compensate
fully these few seriously injured victims probably does not justify
the burden of heavy premiums which would be imposed on poor
motorists.
Because of their cost, unlimited-benefit plans are not likely to be
enacted. Representatives of the poor should support plan features
which will hold down overall costs and reduce the share borne by
the poor. They should then review cost projections for their juris-
dictions and support the highest benefit level they feel poor motor-
ists can afford. They especially should be willing to support a high
limit for medical benefits. °
C. Coordination of Benefits
Because of the collateral source rule, some automobile accident
victims have been able to collect from several different sources for
the same out-of-pocket loss. Although the rule can be defended,25'
247. See Pearson, Implementing the No-Fault Concept: An Analysis of Some
Alternatives, 44 Miss. L.J. 74, 87-89 (1973).
248. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COM-
PENSATION STUDY, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT IN-
JURIES 89 (1971).
249. Pearson, supra note 247, at 91.
250. See notes 225-27 supra and accompanying text.
251. For example, Posner argues that the rule which permits an accident victim
to collect from insurance he has purchased, such as health insurance, and from a
tortfeasor for the same loss, is economically sound. He indicates that requiring the
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it makes little sense to compel people to buy more insurance than
they need. Allowing duplicate coverage is bad enough; compelling
212it amounts to forcing people to gamble.
Two issues emerge with respect to coordination of benefits. The
first is whether no-fault benefits will be a primary or secondary
source of reparations. Making no-fault insurance primary would
mean that every accident victim would collect from the no-fault
plan and from no other source. That would reduce the cost of other
private and government insurance plans like Blue Cross, work-
men's compensation, and Social Security which would no longer
cover losses caused by automobile accidents. Making no-fault
primary also simplifies the resolution of the issue of compulsory
coverage. Every car owner must have no-fault insurance, and no
other form of insurance acts as a substitute for any part of the bene-
fit package. In addition, making no-fault insurance primary avoids
the externalization of accident costs which occurs when other repa-
rations sources are allowed to be primary.253
The second issue is how to prevent insureds from paying for
duplicate coverage even after double recovery has been eliminated.
For example, whether no-fault or Blue Cross is primary, the victim
will collect from only one of the two sources. If no-fault is pri-
mary, Blue Cross should reduce premiums because it no longer
covers medical loss in automobile accidents. Making Blue Cross
primary would reduce the cost of no-fault coverage, but it would re-
quire the no-fault insurer to ascertain whether a policyholder has
Blue Cross at the time he buys automobile insurance and at the
time of each claim. The burden on the no-fault insurer of determin-
ing the existence of health insurance coverage might even eliminate
the cost savings produced by making no-fault secondary.254
Some plans make no-fault coverage secondary in cases covered
by workmen's compensation or government insurance, including
Social Security disability benefits. 255  Poor motorists will generally
fare better if accident costs are externalized to the fullest extent
tortfeasor to pay the full loss maximizes deterrence and that permitting the victim
to collect from his insurance simply gives him what he has paid for. R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.12, at 83-84 (1972). Literature on the rule is
cited in C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 519-21
(2d ed. 1969).
252. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, AFTER CARS CRASH 51-52 (1967).
253. See notes 83-94 supra and accompanying text.
254. Spangenberg, No-Fault Fact, Fiction, and Fallacy, 44 Miss. L.J. 15, 22
(1973).
255. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.736(4) (1972); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 294-5(b) (Supp. 1974); N.Y. INS. LAW § 671.2(b) (McKinney Supp. 1974-75).
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possible. Costs borne by government insurance, workmen's com-
pensation, and other sources will not be reflected in the premiums
for the compulsory automobile insurance package. This will help
make automobile insurance affordable for the poor. When the
other source of reparations is another form of private insurance, like
Blue Cross or other health insurance, making that source primary
would help some poor people at the expense of others. For exam-
ple, motorists would pay less for no-fault coverage if Blue Cross
were primary, but nonmotorists would then pay more for Blue
Cross. 56 The difficulty occurs in adjusting individual premiums.
If Blue Cross is primary, those who have it should pay less for no-
fault insurance than those who do not. Making this adjustment can
be expensive and difficult because of the desire to compel everyone
to have coverage. If no-fault insurance is optional, an insured who
claimed to have Blue Cross but did not have it would simply be left
without a source of reparations.
On the other hand, if health insurance is made secondary, health
insurance rates could be reduced;. however, the actual cost savings
might go to employers rather than to insured individuals. Some
plans permit health insurers to make their coverage secondary to
256. At first glance, the order in which sources of compensation are looked
to might be a matter of indifference. Since the cost of the source of
compensation will reflect the amounts of compensation paid out, making,
for example, no-fault primary and general medical insurance secondary
will increase the cost of the former but decrease the cost of the latter.
But a closer look reveals factors which suggest that the order in which
sources of compensation are used does make a difference.
One of these factors is the lack of complete identity of the classes of no-
fault insureds and collateral source insureds. If collateral sources are
primary, the cost of no-fault insurance will be less, even to those who do
not themselves pay for collateral source insurance. But since the reduced
cost of no-fault insurance resulting from collateral sources will be spread
among all no-fault insureds, including those without collateral sources, the
reduction in the cost of no-fault insurance will be less to those with col-
lateral sources than the increase in the cost of the collateral sources. In
effect, those with collateral sources will subsidize those without. An even
greater subsidy is extracted from those who pay for collateral sources but not
for no-fault insurance-those who live in non-automobile owning house-
holds-for this group gets no benefit at all from the reduction in no-fault
insurance premiums caused by making collateral sources primary.
Pearson, supra note 247, at 95.
There will be poor people in the classes which are being subsidized. This subsidy
problem would exist, however, only if no-fault insureds are not classified for rating
purposes into those who have health insurance and those who do not. By charging
those with health insurance a lower premium, the plan would avoid spreading the
cost saving derived from making health insurance primary over all no-fault insureds.
Likewise, health insurers could charge those who own cars, and thus are more
likely to be auto accident victims, more than those who do not own cars. Such
rate classification involves costs which might offset the advantage of eliminating
duplication of benefits.
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no-fault but require that health insurance premiums be reduced and
that the reduction be passed on to the individual policyholders.257
Blue Cross and the private health insurers are expected to be
able to provide medical loss protection and possibly other coverages
at a lower cost than automobile insurers.258 Blue Cross is a non-
profit organization exempt from the taxes paid by all private in-
surers. 2 19  If Blue Cross could write the whole no-fault package,
insureds would receive the cost advantage and coordination would
be much simpler. Its nonprofit, tax-exempt status and its immunity
from regulation as a casualty insurer would give the organization a
considerable competitive advantage over other insurers. However,
insurance commissioners are likely to insist on a change in Blue
Cross's preferred status if it attempts to write no-fault coverage
directly.260  Insurance company objections over the competitive
advantage Blue Cross possesses because of its tax exemption might
be met in two ways. If Blue Cross desires to compete for the no-
fault business, it could be subjected to regulation and taxation on
that business. The second option is to eliminate the premium tax
on all insurers writing the basic no-fault coverage. If the state
thinks no-fault coverage is important enough to compel people to
buy it, the state should be willing to sacrifice the tax revenue to
make it more affordable. Both Blue Cross and private health in-
surance are commonly sold on a group basis rather than through
individual policies. Underwriting and administrative costs as well
as agents' commissions are lower with respect to group insurance.
In large groups the employer absorbs much of the administrative
burden.2 6 1 Finally, health insurance is often a fringe benefit wholly
or partly paid for by one's employer. Accordingly, unions are
understandably upset about the prospect of losing the advantage
of employer-paid health insurance if no-fault is made primary.
257. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.203(a) (Supp. 1975-76); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65B.61 subd. 4 (Supp. 1975-76); S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 204(0, 208(c)
(1974). Colorado requires the premium reduction but does not require that the
savings be passed on to individual insureds. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-709
(1973).
258. Spangenberg, supra note 254, at 29.
259. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1739.02 (Page 1964); Id. § 5725.18 (Page
1973).
260. See D.C. Hearings 34. OHIO DEP'T OF INSURANCE, No-FAULT INSURANCE:
A SPECIAL STUDY PREPARED FOR THE OHIO SENATE COMM. ON FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS, INSURANCE, AND ELECTIONS 16-17. Maryland permits Blue Cross
and other health insurers to sell the whole no-fault package separately from lia-
bility insurance. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539 (Supp. 1974). Blue Cross is
willing to write income- and replacement-services coverage in addition to medical
expense coverage. 1973 Senate Commerce Hearings 302.
261. R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 481 (5th ed. 1972).
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Also, they may have negotiated employer-paid wage continuation
plans, which would be replaced by no-fault coverage for auto acci-
dents.262
The best way to allow those who have health insurance to substi-
tute their coverage for no-fault coverage is to encourage no-fault
insurers to offer reduced rates to those who have health insurance
and agree to collect their medical loss from that source. The no-
fault coverage would then exclude benefits for medical loss covered
by the health insurance. The same type of exclusion could be of-
fered with respect to income-loss protection for insureds who are
covered by wage continuation plans. This would allow people who
have health insurance to use that coverage rather than buying new
and perhaps more expensive coverage from an automobile insurer.
The Uniform Act permits insurers to offer reduced rates to in-
sureds who elect to substitute their health insurance coverage. The
premium reduction is likely to be offered to groups in which all
members have health insurance. It is less likely to be offered on an
individual policy basis due to the administrative burden of checking
on the health coverage in individual cases. The Uniform Act also
provides that the no-fault insurer is liable for those benefits which
the collateral source is obligated to provide if that source fails to
provide them.263 Insurers therefore are expected to exercise re-
straint in offering reduced premiums to insureds with collateral
sources.
264
On the other hand, S. 354 permits the states to study the problem
of coordination of benefits and to determine which of two ap-
proaches produces the most economical coverage. Either no-fault
premiums will be reduced for those with group health insurance or
health insurance premiums will be lowered. 265 The choice will be
based upon empirical evidence and will be reviewed by the com-
missioners every three years.266 One of the considerations in the
decision is the possibility that permitting some insureds to use their
health insurance might discriminate unfairly against those who are
left to buy no-fault coverage for medical loss. 267 Thus, representa-
tives of the poor should become familiar with the number of poor
people in their jurisdiction who do not have health insurance. It is
likely that most of the people without health insurance will be poor.
262. P. GILLESPIE & M. KLIPPER, NO-FAULT 63 (1972).
263. UMVARA § 23(c).
264. UMVARA § 14, Comment, at 42.
265. S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 204(f), 208(c) (1974).
266. Id. § 208(c)(5).
267. Id. § 208(c).
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The cost of their no-fault coverage will be higher if those who have
group health insurance are allowed to opt out of the medical cover-
age portion of the no-fault plan. This could occur because many
people left in the no-fault pool might be less desirable risks, the aged,
the disabled, and the unemployed. If enough people opted to use
their health insurance, the no-fault pool could suffer from adverse
selection. Rates for no-fault insureds would have to be higher be-
cause the pool would be without many of the best risks who help
hold down the rate of losses. If that many people did opt to use their
health insurance plans, the great mass of insureds would be better
off and those who remained in the no-fault market could be served
by an assigned risk or pool facility. 268  Those who must buy the
no-fault medical loss coverage, can only hope that group automobile
insurance will be legalized and that it will grow in popularity.269
Unreasonable legal barriers to group marketing should be removed
by state or federal legislation so that consumers can enjoy the cost
savings available through that marketing method. 7 °
Plans which fail to coordinate benefits, especially no-fault and
health insurance benefits, will force poor motorists to pay for dupli-
cate coverage which they do not need and cannot afford. Unfor-
tunately, many enacted plans have made little attempt to deal with
this difficult issue.
III. CONCLUSION
No-fault automobile insurance will affect both rich and poor,
but it will not affect them equally. Proposed no-fault legislation
presents legislators with the opportunity to improve the manner in
which poor people are treated in the automobile accident repara-
tions system. Unfortunately, as many of the deficiencies in the
enacted plans demonstrate, some states already have missed this
opportunity. In order to avoid future neglect, representatives of the
poor should study the no-fault plans proposed or enacted in their
jurisdictions to determine whether their constituents are deriving
the maximum benefit at a minimum cost. Judged by this test, the
268. Cf. H. DENENBERG & S. KIMBALL, MASS MARKETING OF PROPERTY AND
LIABILITY INSURANCE 57-58, 83 (1970).
269. Most states prohibit group marketing of automobile insurance. W. ROKES,
NO-FAULT INSURANCE 10 (1971).
270. Id. at 11-12; H. DENENBERG & S. KIMBALL, MASS MARKETING OF PROPERTY
AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 93-112 (1970). Indications are that with the removal
of legal impediments and the conversion to no-fault, the giant health and accident
insurers will enter the automobile insurance field and promote group coverage
using their experience in group life and health insurance. P. GILLESPIE & M.
KLIPPER, NO-FAULT 59 (1972).
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state no-fault legislation enacted to date improves the situation of
the poor only slightly. Pennsylvania and Michigan have the best
plans although there is room for improvement in each.27' On the
other hand, several of the state enacted add-on plans do little to
improve the traditional tort liability system which they supplement.
In those states where no-fault legislation has not been enacted,
plans which follow the format of the Uniform Act should be sup-
ported. While encouraging enactment, however, representatives of
the poor also should advocate some reduction in the benefit limits
which the Act employs. With this modification, the Act can be re-
garded as an acceptable solution to the problems which no-fault
insurance raises for the poor.
National no-fault legislation, such as the National No-Fault
Motor Vehicle Insurance Act in the form in which it passed the
Senate in 1974, remains the best hope of the poor. That bill pro-
vided unlimited medical benefits and reasonable compensation for
other pecuniary losses. It covered losses suffered by both innocent
and culpable noncontributing victims. It compelled no-fault cover-
age, but allowed states to avoid compelling liability coverage. The
271. Both provide unlimited medical and rehabilitation benefits. They have
relatively high income benefits, $1,000 per month for three years in Michigan and
$1,000 per month up to $15,000 in Pennsylvania. Proof of expenses incurred for
substitute services is necessary for replacement-services benefits in both states.
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 500.3107 (Supp. 1975-76); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 1009.202 (Supp. 1975-76). The plans could be improved by reducing income
benefits somewhat and by providing for a scheduled benefit for replacement ser-
vices rather than by requiring proof of substitute services. See note 241 supra and
accompanying text. Michigan does mitigate the unfairness of the high income limit
by requiring that actual income-loss potential be considered in rating. See note 180
supra and accompanying text.
Neither state uses a registration mechanism to compel coverage. There will
be too many uninsured poor motorists, and they will be subject to criminal sanctions
for failure to be insured. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 500.3102(2) (Supp. 1975);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1009.104, .601 (Supp. 1975-76). Both restrict fault-based
loss-cost-transfer. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3116 (Supp. 1975); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.111(a) (Supp. 1975-76). Pennsylvania has a good provision on
coordination of benefits but Michigan is deficient in this respect. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, §§ 1009.203(a)-(b) (Supp. 1975-76); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 500.3109-
.3109a (Supp. 1975-76); see notes 256-69 supra and accompanying text. Neither
state requires collision insurance but Michigan requires a peculiar kind of third-
party no-fault insurance for damage to property other than cars. MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. §§ 500.3101, 500.3121 (Supp. 1975-76). Both states unfortunately allow tort
suits for all income loss in excess of the monthly limit. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 500.3135 (Supp. 1975-76); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1009.202(b), .301(a)(4)
(Supp. 1975-76); see notes 205-15 supra and accompanying text. Finally, both states
provide for innocent noncontributing victims and Pennsylvania is the only state which
permits an uninsured motorist to collect no-fault benefits. MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. §§ 500.3113, .3115, .3172 (Supp. 1975-76); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1009.108,
.201 (Supp. 1975-76).
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restrictive tort threshhold employed specified injury criteria only
and avoided the inequities associated with criteria based on dollars
of loss. The bill also restricted suits for excess economic loss,
prohibited loss-cost-transfer, and provided for coordination of bene-
fits.
Representatives of the poor should support similar federal
legislation which would improve enacted state no-fault plans and
impose a quality no-fault plan on states which have not enacted
one.
Unless the interests of the poor are well represented as the no-
fault debate continues, the poor will be exposed to the risk of paying











No aggregate limit. Medical benefit $25,000 per person. Un-
limited rehabilitation (insurers obligation presumed satisfied
by payment of $25,000 in five years). Income benefit $125/wk.
-52 wk. maximum. Replacement services $15/day-52 wk.




Innocent-no assigned-claims plan but uninsured car owner liable
as insurer.
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-4-706, 10-4-705(2) (1973).
Aggregate limit $5,000 for medical, rehabilitation; 85% of the
value of income, replacement services up to $200/wk. Death
benefits of $2,000 for funeral and $200/wk. Income or replace-




CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-320, 38-319(b), 38-338, 38-321(a)
(Supp. 1975).
Aggregate limit of $5,000 for medical, rehabilitation, replacement
services, income (without periodic limit), and funeral expenses
up to $1,000 (no other death benefit).
Noncontributor victims:
Culpable-no benefits.
Innocent-no assigned-claims plan but uninsured car owner li-
able as insurer.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.736, 627.733(4) (1972).
Aggregate limit of $5,000 for medical, rehabilitation up to $2,500,
85% of the loss of income up to $200/wk., replacement services
up to $20/day, funeral expenses up to $1500. Death benefit





GA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-3403b, 56-3408b, 56-3407b (Supp. 1974).
1. "Noncontributor victims" are those who have not contributed to the insurance fund by pay-
ing no-fault premiums. "Culpable" victims are car owners who were required to buy insurance but
failed to do so. "Innocent" victims are those who do not own cars and thus have no obligation to
have insurance. Unless there is an assigned-claims plan, innocent victims will collect no-fault bene-
fits only when the accident involves a contributor. See notes 218-24 supra and accompanying text.
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Aggregate limit of $15,000 for medical, rehabilitation, income up
to $800/mo., replacement services up to $800/mo. Death
benefit to survivors up to periodic and aggregate limits for ift-





HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 294-2(10), 294-3 (Supp. 1974).
No aggregate limit. Medical benefit $2,000, rehabilitation $2,000,
income $650/mo.-1 yr. maximum. Replacement services
$12/day-1 yr. maximum. Death benefit to survivors for in-
come loss minus expenses avoided subject to monthly and




KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3103, 40-3109(a)(4), 40-3116(c) (Supp.
1974).
Aggregate limit $10,000 for medical, rehabilitation, income and
replacement services ($200/wk. total). Death benefits to sur-
vivors for income and replacement services subject to $200[wk.




Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.39-020(2), -020(5), -130, -160, -030
(Supp. 1974).
Aggregate limit $2,000 for medical, income (without periodic
limit), replacement services (without periodic limit). Funeral




MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §§ 34A, 34N (Supp. 1975).
No aggregate limit. Unlimited medical and rehabilitation. In-
come: $1,000/mo.-3 yr. maximum (subject to adjustment for
inflation). Replacement services $20/day-3 yr. maximum.
Death benefits for support and services victim would have pro-
vided subject to periodic and 3 yr. limits on income and re-




MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3107, 500.3108, 500.3113,
500.3115, 500.3171, 500.3172 (Supp. 1975-76).
Aggregate limits: $30,000 including up to $20,000 of medical ex-




$15/day; survivor's economic loss benefits up to $200/wk.,
plus survivor's replacement services up to $200 per week;





MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65B.44, 65B.63, 65B.64, 65B.46 (Supp.
1975-76).
Aggregate limit $10,000 for medical and rehabilitation. Income
$175/wk., replacement services $18/day-for a maximum of
104 wks. Death benefits: minimum, $5,000; maximum, dis-
ability income victim would have received in 1 year, which
would have been used for support of survivors minus expenses




NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 698.070, 698.230, 698.380 (1973).
No aggregate limit. Unlimited medical and rehabilitation. In-
come $100/wk.-52 wks. Replacement services $12/day up to
$4,380. Death benefits to survivor subject to same limits as
income and replacement services and $1,000 funeral expenses.
N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 39:6A-4 (1973).
Aggregate limit $50,000 for medical and rehabilitation. Income
$1,000/mo.-3 yrs. Replacement services $25/day-I yr. No




N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 671.1, 672.1 (McKinney Supp. 1974-75).
No aggregate limit. Unlimited medical and rehabilitation. In-
come $1,000/mo., adjusted by ratio of Pennsylvania per capita
income to United States average, or up to $15,000 per year if
insured discloses income to insurer at time of policy. Death
benefits for support and services victim would have provided
minus expenses avoided, subject to limit of $5,000.
Noncontributor victims:
Culpable-assigned-claims plan pays minimum benefits which
could have been purchased.
Innocent-assigned-claims plan.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1009.103, .108, .201, .202 (Supp. 1975-76).
No aggregate limit. Unlimited medical and rehabilitation. In-
come 50% of gross wage loss up to $50/wk. for 52 wks., and
50% of gross up to $25/wk. for second 52 wk. period. Replace-
ment services for housewife victims $25/wk. for 12 wks.
Death benefit maximum $10,000. Scheduled benefits for other

















P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2053, 2054 (Supp. 1974-75).
No aggregate limit. Medical and rehabilitation $2,000. Income
$150/wk.-52 wks. Replacement services $12/day-365 days
(no requirement that cost for services actually be incurred).




UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31-41-6, 31-41-7, (Repl. vol. 4A 1974).
Aggregate limit $10,000 for medical and rehabilitation. Income
$200/wk. Replacement services $18/day. Death benefit of
$5,000 (not included in aggregate limit) and funeral expenses




Am. Sub. H.B. No. 251, 110th Ohio General Assembly, Regular
Sess. §§ 3938.04(B), (C), .10 (D), .13(A) (1973-74).
No aggregate limit. Unlimited medical and rehabilitation. In-
come $1,000/mo., adjusted by ratio of state per capita income
to United States average with total limit minimum of $15,000.
Replacement services subject to reasonable exclusions or limits
by states. Death benefit to survivors of support and services
victim would have contributed minus expenses avoided or other
reasonable limits set by state.
Noncontributor victims:
Culpable-assigned-claims plan pays minimum benefits which
could have been purchased.
Innocent-assigned-claims plan.
S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 103(2), 108, 204(a), 204(b)(1)(a),
203, 204(c) (1974).
No aggregate limit. Unlimited medical and rehabilitation. In-
come loss and replacement services $200/wk. total without
time limit. Death benefit to survivors for support and ser-
vices victim would have provided minus expenses avoided,
subject to $200/wk. limit without time limit.
Noncontributor victims:
Culpable-assigned-claims plan pays minimum benefits which
could have been purchased.
Innocent-assigned-claims plan.











No aggregate limit. Medical benefit $2,000 for loss incurred
within 24 months of accident. 70% of income benefit up to
$140/wk., for 52 wks. Replacement services $70/wk. for 52





ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-4014 (Supp. 1973).
Aggregate limit $10,000/person, $20,000/accident for medical, in-
come (without periodic limit), replacement services, and fu-




DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §§ 2 118(a)(2) (1975).
Aggregate limit $2,500 for medical, lost income (without periodic
limit) or replacement services (without periodic limit), and




MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539 (Supp. 1974).
No aggregate limit. Medical benefit $5,000. Income $750/mo.





ORE. REV. STAT. § 743.800 (1973).
Aggregate limit $1,000 for medical, income (without periodic lim-





S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46.750.111, 46.750.131 (Supp. 1974).
No aggregate limit. Medical benefit $2,000. Income $60/wk.
for 52 wks. Funeral expenses (included in medical limit).




S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. §§ 58-23-8, 58-23-6(4) (Supp. 1974).
Aggregate limit $2,500 for medical, income (without periodic
limit), replacement services (without periodic limit), and
funeral expenses.




TEX. INS. CODE art. 5.06-3(b) (Supp. 1974).
Virginia No aggregate limit. Medical benefit $2,000 (includes funeral ex-









Liability' No-Fault2  Means of compelling coverage3
Colorado 15/30/5 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
F F 10-4-706(a), 10-4-705(1); 42-7-301
(1973).
F
Connecticut 20/40/5 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-112(a),
C C 38-327(d) (Supp. 1975).
Cr, F
Florida 15/30/50 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.733(3)(a),
C C 627.735(1), 324.051 (1972).
S, F
1. In this column insurance coverage is presented in the following order: dollars of personal in-
jury per person, dollars of personal injury per accident, dollars of property damage per accident.
All amounts given are x $1000.
2. In either the "Liability" or "No-Fault" column an "F' indicates that the financial responsi-
bility mechanism is the only means of compelling that type of insurance coverage. A "C" indicates
that some means, other than or in addition to the financial responsibility law, is used to compel cov-
erage. An "0" means that the coverage is optional.
3. In this column symbols indicate the means used to compel car owners to insure. "R" indi-
cates that some proof of insurance, either a certificate from an insurer or an affidavit from the car
owner, is necessary to register a car in the jurisdiction. "Cr" means that a criminal penalty is pro-
vided for driving uninsured. "S" means that a car owner's driver's license may be suspended for
driving uninsured even if he is never involved in an accident. "F" means that the traditional financial










































GA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-3403b,
C 56-3412b, 56-9915.2, 92A-605
(Supp. 1974).
R, Cr, F
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 294-8,
294-10(a), 294-39(a) (Supp. 1974).
R, Civil Penalty
C
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3104(a)
C & (e), 40-3107, 40-3118 (Supp. 1974).
R, Cr, S
Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 304.39-060(4),
0 -110, .99-050 (Supp. 1974).
Civil Penalty
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90,
C §§ 34A, 34B, 34H, 34J (Supp. 1975).
R, Cr, S
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3101,
500.3102(2), 257.501-.532 (Supp.
1975-76).
C Cr, S, F
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65B.48,
C 65B.49, 65B.67, (Supp. 1975-76).
Cr, S
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 698.190,
F 698.200, 698.320, 485.010-.420
(1973).
F
N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 39:6A-3,
C 39:6A-4, 39:6A-15 (1973).
Cr, S
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 311,
C 312, 318, 319 (McKinney Supp.
1974-75); N.Y. INS. LAW § 672
(McKinney Supp. 1974-75).
R, Cr, S
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1009.104(a),
C .601 (Supp. 1975-76); Id. tit. 75, §§
1401-36 (1971).
Cr, F









UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31-41-4(1),
31-41-5(a), 31-41-13, 41-12-1 to
41-12-7 (1973).




































Am. Sub. H.B. No. 251, 110th Ohio
C General Assembly, Regular Sess.
§§ 3938.02, 3938.99 (1973-74); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4509.0 1-.72
(Page 1973).
Cr, S, F
C Left up to states. S. 354, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. § 104(a) (1974).
UMVARA §§ 7, 10(a), 37. Section
7(j) is optional. It would use
registration.
C Cr, R or F
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-1401 to 1493
O (1957); 75-1466, 66-4015 (Supp. 1973).
F
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §§ 2118,
2901-72 (1975).
C F, Cr
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539, art.
C 66-1/2, 7-101 to -103 (Supp. 1974).
R, Cr, F
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 486.011(7),
F 743.800, 743.805 (1973).
F
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-750.32, .111,
C .119, .120, .121, .146, .151, .152
(Supp. 1974).
R, Cr, S
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§
O 32-35-70, 58-23-7 (Supp. 1974).
F
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 6701h,
O § 21 (Supp. 1974-75); TEX. INS. CODE













COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-4-714 (1973).
S or $400
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.












Recoverable only in cases above






1. In this column, the symbol "S" means specified injuries. Pain and suffering
thresholds list injuries for which pain-and-suffering damages may be recovered. The list of injuries
may be long or short and the definitions will determine the extent to which the threshold is restrictive.
See note 138 supra. The dollar figure in the column is dollars of medical loss, except where otherwise
indicated. A high dollar threshold could be liberal if the definition of medical loss were sufficiently
broad. A low dollar threshold could be quite restrictive if medical loss were narrowly defined. Thus,
in any jurisdiction, it is necessary to consider the list of specified injuries and how they are defined and
the definition of medical expense in order to determine whether the threshold is high or low. Gener-
ally, however, the plans which have the higher dollar thresholds tend to be more restrictive on tort
suits than the others.
2. In this column, the phrase "all recoverable" means that all economic loss in excess
of specific limits on benefits for medical loss, income loss, etc., is recoverable in tort. For
a high income earner, this can mean that a tort action is possible after the first week of
disability. See notes 205-15 supra and accompanying text.
25/50/5
F
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-504;















S or exhaustion of no-fault
benefits or $1,500 medical
loss until 9/1/75; thereafter
medical threshold is adjusted






§ 40-3117 (Supp. 1974).
S or $1,000
Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 304.39-060 (Supp. 1974).
S or $500
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1975).
S; no dollar threshold
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 500.3135(l) (Supp.
1975-76).
S or 60 days
disability or $2,000
MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65B.51 (Supp. 1975-76).




S or soft tissue injury







S or 60 days
disability or $750
PA. STAT. ANN.
















Recoverable only in cases above
pain & suffering threshold.















Damages for pain and
suffering in excess of $1,000
are recoverable.




§§ 31-41-9(1) (Repl. vol. 4A
1974).
S or $1,500
Am. Sub. H.B. No. 251,
110th Ohio General Assembly,
Regular Sess. § 3938.11(A)
(1973-74).
S or 90 days
disability; no dollar threshold
S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §
206(a)(5) (1974).
Damages in excess of $5,000
if caused by specified injury
or if victim is totally disabled
for six months or more.
UMVARA § 5(a)(7).
Damages, other than pain and







Only loss in excess of aggregate
no-fault benefit limit is
recoverable.
Id. §§ 206(a)(4), 204(b)(2).
Only loss incurred after six
months of disability or death
is recoverable.
Id. § 5(a)(6).
